





THE DOCTRINAL UNITY OF ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY  
AND MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY 
MARK A. GEISTFELD†
 
Market-share liability has been one of the most controversial doctrines in tort 
law, with a strong plurality of courts rejecting the doctrine on the ground that it 
radically departs from the fundamental tort principle of causation.  Courts that 
have adopted this liability rule, though, believe they are adhering to the principle 
of causation.  In the first case to adopt market-share liability, the California Su-
preme Court claimed that the liability rule is grounded upon an extension of al-
ternative liability, a doctrine that has been accepted by virtually all jurisdictions.  
The court never adequately explained how alternative liability can be modified to 
yield market-share liability, and the only explanation provided by torts scholars 
involves redefining the tort right to permit compensation for tortious risk, condi-
tional upon the occurrence of injury, rather than for the injury itself.  However, 
courts do not conceptualize the tort right in these terms, for otherwise the doctrine 
of market-share liability would be uncontroversial.  As this Article shows, market-
share liability can be derived from alternative liability in a manner that neither 
redefines the tort right nor departs from the principle of causation.  Alternative 
liability permits the plaintiff to prove causation against the group of defendants.  
This characterization of the causal rule has been recognized by some torts schol-
ars, but has never been justified.  The Article shows that evidential grouping is a 
defensible principle implicit in numerous cases involving analogous causal prob-
lems, including the asbestos cases.  Evidential grouping not only explains the 
doctrine of alternative liability, it shows how a modification of that liability rule 
yields market-share liability largely for reasons given by the California Supreme 
Court.  This conceptualization of alternative liability and market-share liability 
also explains the otherwise puzzling liability rule adopted by courts in the asbestos 
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cases.  Due to this doctrinal unity, the widespread acceptance of alternative liabil-
ity should make market-share liability more widely acceptable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of market-share liability may have deep implications 
for tort law.  The reason involves the element of causation.  To estab-
lish tort liability, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant’s tortious conduct caused the injury for 
which she seeks compensation.1  The element of causation ties the vio-
lation of the plaintiff’s tort right to the defendant’s breach of duty, 
entitling the plaintiff to receive compensation from the defendant 
wrongdoer.  A difficult causal question arises when a plaintiff can suf-
ficiently prove that multiple manufacturers acted tortiously by selling 
defective fungible products, each of which may have caused the plain-
tiff physical harm and one of which did, but the plaintiff cannot iden-
tify the particular manufacturer that sold the injury-causing product.  
In the seminal case Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the California Su-
preme Court held that the plaintiff could recover against such a group 
of manufacturers comprising a “substantial share” of the relevant mar-
ket.2  As the court subsequently made clear, this doctrine of market-
share liability imposes several liability upon each defendant manufac-
1 E.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 328 (Ill. 1990) (describing the 
causal requirement as “[a] fundamental principle of tort law”). 
2 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980). 
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turer in proportion to its market share.3  A manufacturer that had ten 
percent of the relevant market, for example, would be severally liable 
for ten percent of the plaintiff’s harm.  According to the preponder-
ance of the evidence, this manufacturer did not cause the plaintiff’s 
harm; the evidence only establishes that the manufacturer created a 
ten percent chance of causing the injury.  The defendant manufac-
turer may thus be incurring liability only for the tortious imposition of 
risk, with the profound implication that the plaintiff’s tort right in-
volves protection from risk rather than protection from physical harm. 
Market-share liability is commonly understood in precisely this 
fashion.  In a series of influential articles, leading torts scholars have 
argued that market-share liability is based upon an emergent risk-
based conception of tort liability that is formulated to promote deter-
rence in a fair manner.4  A deterrence-based torts system devises liabil-
ity rules in order to reduce unreasonable risks.  That objective does 
not depend upon the occurrence of physical harm, because an actor 
who faces liability for creating an unreasonable risk has an incentive 
to act reasonably.5  But when the liability rule instead requires that the 
unreasonable risk must actually cause physical harm, the actor can 
avoid liability in conflict with the deterrence objective.  The unrea-
3 Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 486-87 (Cal. 1988). 
4 See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law:  Reflections on the DES 
Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713, 749 (1982) (concluding that Sindell “point[s] toward a rule 
that imposes liability for the creation of a risk and apportions liability according to the 
magnitude of that risk”); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure 
Cases:  A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 866-68 (1984) 
(identifying market-share liability as a form of proportional liability based upon the 
risk that the defendant caused injury); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 
CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1819-20 (1985) (“In effect, the Sindell court recognized a new legal 
injury:  tortious exposure to a risk that possibly led to a subsequent injury.”); see also 
Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving 
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1381 (1981) (arguing 
that the Sindell decision “is an important signal of the increased willingness of courts to 
integrate chance into its resolution of torts cases”).  Although the analyses in each of 
these articles proceed from quite different premises about the appropriate purpose of 
tort liability, their shared perspectives illustrate the wide-ranging agreement among 
torts scholars about the appropriate interpretation of market-share liability. 
5 Cf. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 229 (1987) (explaining why “the idea of causation can largely be dispensed 
with in an economic analysis of torts” that seeks to reduce risks in order to minimize 
accident costs); Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts:  An Essay for 
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 85 (1975) (“One could do away with the but for 
test and employ other methods to [decide whether avoidance is worthwhile].  For ex-
ample, one could simply guess at the size of the injury costs that will be associated in 
the future with behavior causally linked to such injury costs.”). 
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sonable risk may not materialize into injury.  The unreasonable risk 
may not double the underlying risk of injury, making it impossible for 
the plaintiff to prove that the physical harm, more likely than not, was 
caused by the tortious conduct rather than by the underlying risk of 
injury.  Or the plaintiff may only be able to identify the group of ac-
tors who created the tortious risk but not the particular actor who 
caused the physical harm, as in the market-share cases.  These safety 
problems could be avoided if the plaintiff can establish liability by 
proving that the defendant exposed her to an unreasonable risk of 
physical harm.  This form of liability is also fair insofar as the moral 
quality of a defendant’s behavior does not depend upon the fortuity, 
or “moral luck,” of whether the unreasonable risk caused physical 
harm.  Rather than distinguish among otherwise identical actors on 
the contingent basis of whether their unreasonable behavior caused 
physical harm, tort liability could treat each actor equally by making 
each responsible for her own behavior—the unreasonable risk she 
imposed upon the plaintiff.6
A pure risk-based liability rule has two substantial practical prob-
lems that are avoided by market-share liability.  First, once liability no 
longer depends upon the occurrence of physical harm, there will be a 
huge increase in the number of suits.  Second, plaintiffs who were ex-
posed to the same risk will receive the same damages, regardless of 
whether they actually suffer the physical harm.  To reduce the num-
ber of lawsuits and increase the amount of compensation available to 
the physically injured victims, a risk-based tort rule can be conditional 
upon the occurrence of physical harm.  Only those individuals who 
were exposed to the risk and suffered the type of physical harm 
threatened by the risk can recover.  If the underlying risk were 1 in 
10,000, for example, the harm requirement ordinarily would yield 1 
claim for every 10,000 individuals exposed to the risk, whereas a rule 
lacking that requirement would produce up to 10,000 claims.  The re-
duced number of claimants also increases the amount of compensa-
tion for the physically harmed victims.  For example, an injured plain-
6 See Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387, 401-05 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (explaining why 
the “liability lottery” based on the occurrence of physical harm can be fair, but no 
more so than other liability schemes like those based on the creation of risk); Christo-
pher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 
439, 462-66 (1990) (using the theory of corrective justice to argue that an individual 
should be liable for increasing the risk of harm, whether or not the harm actually oc-
curs). 
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tiff could sue a single manufacturer having ten percent of the market 
and recover damages for ten percent of the total harm.  Even though 
the plaintiff was exposed to a small risk of injury (1 in 10,000), given 
that she has been physically harmed, the likelihood is ten percent that 
this particular manufacturer caused the harm.  By conditioning liabil-
ity on the occurrence of physical harm, market-share liability can re-
duce the number of suits, increase the amount of compensation for 
physically harmed victims, and still compensate the plaintiff for risk 
exposure and not for the injury itself—the evidence only establishes 
the risk exposure, conditional upon the occurrence of physical harm, 
and does not prove that the ten percent risk actually caused the in-
jury. 
Despite the appeal of market-share liability, the doctrine has had a 
mixed reception in the courts.  The prototypical case for market-share 
liability involves the synthetic drug diethylstilbestrol (DES).  A “num-
ber of courts” have adopted market-share liability in these cases, but a 
“roughly equal number of courts have declined to craft a new theory 
for DES plaintiffs, expressing concern that to do so would rend too 
great a chasm in the tort-law requirement of factual causation.”7
As this case law reveals, the courts do not conceptualize market-
share liability as providing compensation for exposure to a tortious 
risk.  A DES plaintiff typically can prove that each defendant DES 
manufacturer, more likely than not, exposed her to a tortious risk that 
may have caused the physical harm.  By establishing that a defendant 
manufacturer had ten percent of the relevant market, for example, 
the plaintiff has proven that this defendant exposed her to a ten per-
cent chance of causing the physical harm.  The causal requirement 
would be satisfied, then, if the tort compensation were for the risk ex-
posure, conditional upon the occurrence of the physical harm, rather 
than for the harm itself.  Courts, however, have concluded that mar-
ket-share liability would “rend too great a chasm,” implying that the 
liability must be based upon the tortious infliction of physical harm.  
The fact that a defendant DES manufacturer had ten percent of the 
relevant market does not prove that its product, more likely than not, 
caused the plaintiff’s bodily injury.  The tort right must protect indi-
viduals from physical harm in order for so many courts to conclude 
that market-share liability “requires a profound change in fundamen-
7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. o (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (collecting cases showing that no more than twenty ju-
risdictions have decided the issue, with nine rejecting market-share liability). 
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tal tort principles of causation . . . . [W]e cannot pretend that any 
such theory is consistent with common law principles of tort liability.”8
The courts that have actually adopted market-share liability, 
though, do not believe that it departs from the fundamental tort prin-
ciple of causation.  In the first case to adopt market-share liability, the 
California Supreme Court said that the liability rule is “grounded 
upon an extension of the Summers doctrine.”9  The court was referring 
to the rule of alternative liability adopted in the famous case of Sum-
mers v. Tice.10  Today, “most courts appear to regard [Summers] as es-
tablished law on its facts.”11  Insofar as market-share liability is merely 
an extension of Summers, the doctrine does not depend upon diver-
gent opinions about the principle of causation or the substantive con-
tent of the tort right as involving protection from physical harm (and 
not merely risk exposure). 
Rather than representing conflicting views about the tort princi-
ple of causation, the sharply divided case law on market-share liability 
most plausibly stems from a disagreement about whether the Summers 
doctrine properly extends to market-share liability.  Although the 
California Supreme Court sought to justify market-share liability in 
these terms, it never clearly explained the relevance of the Summers 
doctrine for market-share liability.12  Nor has it adequately explained 
the Summers doctrine of alternative liability.13  Torts scholarship has 
not sufficiently clarified matters either.  In rejecting both alternative 
liability and market-share liability, one court observed that “none of 
the cases or commentaries presents a rigorous analysis of why [the 
doctrines are] ‘fair.’”14  The courts that have rejected market-share li-
ability are understandably wary of the claim that it can be justified by 
alternative liability. 
8 Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc., 751 P.2d 215, 223 (Or. 1988); see also Smith v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 334-40 (Ill. 1990) (providing a survey of cases rejecting 
market-share liability and stressing the common theme that the liability rule is a “radi-
cal” departure from tort principles). 
9 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal. 1980). 
10 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). 
11 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS  § 175, at 428 (2000). 
12 See Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (rejecting 
market-share liability in part because Sindell had not sufficiently articulated the rele-
vant concepts). 
13 E.g., DOBBS, supra note 11, § 175, at 427 (“The opinion in Summers did not spell 
out the reasons for this extraordinary liability in any precise way . . . .”). 
14 Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc., 751 P.2d 215, 222 (Or. 1988). 
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Part I accordingly begins with the Summers doctrine of alternative 
liability, explaining why the rationale for this doctrine does not have 
to depend upon a novel theory of compensation for risk exposure.  To 
recover, the plaintiff must satisfy the ordinary burden of proving cau-
sation with respect to the group of defendant tortfeasors.  Others have 
conceptualized alternative liability in this manner, but have not ex-
plained why the plaintiff can defensibly group a number of independ-
ent tortfeasors in order to establish causation.15  Part I identifies a 
principle implicit in cases involving an analogous causal problem and 
then shows how this principle can justify grouping the defendants for 
evidentiary purposes.  Part I concludes by showing how evidential 
grouping persuasively yields the rule of alternative liability. 
Part II then explains why this rationale for alternative liability ex-
tends to market-share liability, requiring a change in the liability rule 
to reflect the different circumstances in the two types of cases.  Evi-
dential grouping enables the plaintiff to prove causation against the 
group of defendant DES manufacturers, although the underlying 
principle of fairness limits the extent of a defendant’s liability to the 
extent of its responsibility for the causal group.  That limitation is pro-
vided by each defendant’s share of the relevant market.  Evidential 
grouping unites both alternative liability and market-share liability, 
and so the widespread acceptance of alternative liability should help 
to make market-share liability more widely acceptable. 
Part III concludes by identifying some implications of evidential 
grouping.  Market-share liability does not have to be limited to DES 
cases or even to those matters involving defective products.  When the 
requirements for evidential grouping are satisfied, liability is based 
upon the tortious risk created by each defendant, a factor not neces-
sarily dependent on market shares.  The liability rule accordingly pro-
vides many of the benefits of risk-based liability that have been lauded 
by torts scholars.  The justification for liability, however, is based upon 
established tort principles, not on a profound change in the nature of 
the individual right protected by tort law. 
15 See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
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I.  ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY AND EVIDENTIAL GROUPING 
A.  The Puzzle of Alternative Liability 
In the leading case of alternative liability, Summers v. Tice,16 the 
plaintiff was injured while hunting quail with the two defendants.  
Each defendant negligently fired his shotgun in the direction of the 
plaintiff at about the same time from approximately the same dis-
tance.  The plaintiff was struck in the eye and face by a single shot of 
pellets, but could not identify which defendant’s shot had hit him.  
The evidence only established that each defendant had an equal like-
lihood of doing so, leaving the plaintiff unable to prove that either de-
fendant, more likely than not, caused the injury.  Nevertheless, the 
California Supreme Court concluded that it was appropriate to shift 
the burden of proof to the defendants, requiring each to prove that 
he was not the cause of the plaintiff’s injury.  If neither defendant 
could provide such proof, each would be jointly liable for the plain-
tiff’s injury. 
This rule of alternative liability has been adopted by the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts: 
 Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved 
that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there 
is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each 
such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.
17
The rationale for alternative liability is based upon “the injustice 
of permitting proved wrongdoers, who among them have inflicted an 
injury upon the entirely innocent plaintiff, to escape liability merely 
because the nature of their conduct and the resulting harm has made 
it difficult or impossible to prove which of them has caused the 
harm.”18  This justification tracks the reasoning of the Summers court.19
The rule has gained widespread acceptance as reflected in its 
adoption by the Restatement (Third) of Torts.20  According to the Restate-
16 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). 
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965). 
18 Id. cmt. f. 
19 See Summers, 199 P.2d at 2-4 (identifying other cases involving similar facts result-
ing in liability and concluding that liability does not depend upon a concert of action 
among the defendants, as courts had previously found, but instead upon the injustice 
of allowing the defendants to avoid liability despite the plaintiff’s proof that one of 
them tortiously caused the harm). 
20 The Restatement (Third) states: 
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ment (Third), the “rationale for shifting the burden of proof to defen-
dants whose tortious conduct exposed the plaintiff to a risk of harm is 
that, as between two culpable defendants and an innocent plaintiff, it 
is preferable to put the risk of error on the culpable defendants.”21
As formulated, the Restatement rationales for alternative liability 
are not fully persuasive.  The Restatement rule of alternative liability 
expressly applies to “two or more actors,” and so the liability rule 
clearly contemplates that the defendants would incur liability if Sum-
mers had involved three defendant shooters instead of two.  A case of 
this type requires further explanation as to why the plaintiff has 
proven the prima facie case of liability against each of the three de-
fendants.  The plaintiff’s proof only shows that each defendant cre-
ated a one-third chance of causing the injury, a substantial departure 
from the ordinary evidentiary rule requiring the plaintiff to prove that 
each defendant, more likely than not, caused the harm.  The Restate-
ment rationales never explain why the plaintiff’s proof makes each de-
fendant “culpable” in a manner that justifies shifting the burden of 
proof. 
For this same reason, the Restatement rationales do not adequately 
identify the reasons for disabling each defendant from avoiding liabil-
ity by relying upon this infirmity in the plaintiff’s prima facie case.  
But, once the liability rule shifts the burden of proof to the three de-
fendants in a modified Summers case, each one could prove, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that he did not cause the plaintiff’s 
harm; more likely than not, the remaining group of two defendants 
caused the harm.  That type of exculpatory causal proof would com-
pletely undermine the rule of alternative liability in any case involving 
three or more tortfeasors.  After proving that the injury was tortiously 
caused by an unidentifiable tortfeasor within the group of defendants, 
the plaintiff would be unable to recover if each of the three or more 
defendants could then disprove causation by relying on the more-
likely-than-not evidentiary standard as applied to the remaining group 
of defendants.  The final result would produce the “injustice” that the 
When the plaintiff sues all of multiple actors and proves that each engaged in 
tortious conduct that exposed the plaintiff to a risk of physical harm and that 
the tortious conduct of one or more of them caused the plaintiff’s harm but 
the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to prove which actor caused the 
harm, the burden of proof, including both production and persuasion, on 
factual causation is shifted to the defendants. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28(b) (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1, 2005). 
21 Id. cmt. f (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) cmt. f (1965)). 
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rule of alternative liability is designed to avoid.  The “proved wrong-
doers, who among them have inflicted an injury upon the entirely in-
nocent plaintiff [would] escape liability merely because the nature of 
their conduct and the resulting harm has made it difficult or impossi-
ble to prove which of them has caused the harm.”22  To avoid this in-
justice, the liability rule must be interpreted so that a defendant can-
not admit that he may have tortiously caused the harm and then 
exculpate himself solely on the ground that the factual uncertainty 
implies that the remaining defendants, more likely than not, caused 
the injury.  The Restatement (Third) limits a defendant’s exculpatory 
causal proof in this manner without explanation or justification.23
The Restatement (Second) presumably bars such causal proof due to 
the “injustice” of allowing the defendant wrongdoers to escape liabil-
ity only because their tortious conduct created factual uncertainty 
about the actual cause of the injury.  But tortious conduct routinely 
creates factual uncertainty regarding causation.  A defendant who ex-
posed a physically injured plaintiff to a ten percent risk of harm may 
have been the actual cause of the injury, but our limited knowledge of 
the relevant causal processes only allows the causal statement to take a 
probabilistic form.  In such a case, the mere fact that the defendant’s 
tortious conduct makes it impossible for the plaintiff to prove causa-
tion by a preponderance of the evidence does not ordinarily relieve 
the plaintiff of the burden of proof, nor does the factual uncertainty 
disable the defendant from disproving causation by relying on the 
more-likely-than-not evidentiary standard.  What explains the different 
rule with respect to alternative liability? 
The Restatement (Third) does not sufficiently clarify matters by sim-
ply concluding that as between the “culpable” defendant and “inno-
cent” plaintiff, the “risk of error” should be put on the defendant.24  
Carried to its logical conclusion, this proposition implies that a single 
defendant who has acted tortiously should have to disprove causation 
with certainty, for that rule places the risk of error (liability in cases 
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) cmt. f (1965). 
23 The Restatement (Third) states: 
Defendants would be able to satisfy their burden of production when three or 
more defendants are subject to alternative liability in one of two ways:  a de-
fendant might show why it was not the cause of plaintiff’s injury or it might 
show which one of the other defendants was the cause. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 reporters’ note cmt. j 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).  Why the defendant’s exculpatory proof is limited 
to these two forms of proof is never explained or justified. 
24 Id. § 28(b) cmt. f. 
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lacking complete certainty) on the culpable defendant rather than the 
innocent plaintiff.  This possibility is acknowledged and summarily re-
jected by the Restatement (Third):  “The justification for alternative li-
ability might logically begin with consideration of the single-
defendant case in which plaintiff can prove tortious conduct but is 
unable to prove factual causation.  Yet courts do not ordinarily shift 
the burden of proof in those cases.”25  By not shifting the burden of 
proof in these cases, courts have rejected the proposition that the “risk 
of error” should always be placed upon a defendant who has acted un-
reasonably rather than upon the “innocent” plaintiff.  What makes 
that proposition valid in cases of alternative liability? 
In contrast to the Restatement rationales for alternative liability, the 
doctrine is easy to understand when liability is based upon the tortious 
infliction of risk.  The plaintiff in Summers proved, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that each defendant tortiously created a fifty percent 
risk of causing the harm in question.  Neither defendant could pro-
vide causal proof to the contrary.  Each defendant incurred liability 
for fifty percent of the plaintiff’s total damages, an amount exactly 
corresponding to the probability that he caused the harm.  The plain-
tiff received full compensation for the injury from the two defendants, 
but the liability of each defendant was based upon risk and not the 
tortious infliction of injury.  The risk-based interpretation of alterna-
tive liability has been adopted by numerous torts scholars.26
This rationale for alternative liability is problematic.  It implies 
that the widespread acceptance of alternative liability should make 
market-share liability widely acceptable.  However, by rejecting mar-
ket-share liability, a strong plurality of courts have shown that they are 
not willing to make a defendant liable for merely exposing the plain-
tiff to a tortious risk of causing the harm.27  The widespread judicial 
acceptance of alternative liability must rest upon some other rationale, 
which would explain why the Restatements do not justify the doctrine as 
a means of compensating the plaintiff for exposure to tortious risk. 
The doctrine of alternative liability could instead be interpreted as 
relaxing the causation requirement, so that the plaintiff need not 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant tor-
tiously caused the physical harm.  Under this interpretation, the plain-
tiff can sufficiently prove that the defendant actually caused the harm 
25 Id. 
26 This interpretation is adopted by all of the sources cited in note 4, supra. 
27 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
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by proving that the defendant may have caused the harm.  The tort 
compensation is for the injury, and the liability rule merely reduces 
the plaintiff’s burden of proving causation. 
This interpretation is also hard to square with the case law, since a 
strong plurality of courts have rejected the identical rationale for 
market-share liability.  These courts are unwilling to adopt market-
share liability if doing so “would rend too great a chasm in the tort-law 
requirement of factual causation.”28  The unwillingness of these courts 
to adopt a doctrine that erodes the causal requirement strongly sug-
gests that they did not adopt alternative liability in order to ease the 
plaintiff’s burden of proving causation. 
In light of the case law, alternative liability most plausibly involves 
compensation for physical harm without relaxing the plaintiff’s bur-
den of proving causation.  To operate in this manner, alternative li-
ability must apply the plaintiff’s causal proof to the group of defen-
dants rather than to each defendant individually.  In Summers, for 
example, the plaintiff proved that the two defendants, considered to-
gether, more likely than not caused the physical harm.  As the Sum-
mers court concluded, “we believe it is clear that the [trial] court suffi-
ciently found on the issue that defendants were jointly liable and that 
thus the negligence of both was the cause of the injury or to that legal 
effect.”29  By applying the plaintiff’s causal proof to the group of de-
fendants, alternative liability does not reduce the plaintiff’s burden of 
proving causation with respect to the tortious infliction of physical 
harm. 
According to a leading torts treatise, the doctrine of alternative li-
ability can be expressed in terms of such a causal rule: 
When the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an event that 
their combined conduct, viewed as a whole, is a but-for cause of the 
event, and application of the but-for rule to them individually would ab-
solve all of them, the conduct of each is a cause in fact of the event.
30
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. o (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
29 Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948). 
30 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 
268 (5th ed. 1984). 
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A similar causal rule has been proposed by a few scholars.31  It has 
never been adequately developed, however.  As another leading trea-
tise observes: 
[I]t depends on a decision to group various acts of various defendants 
together, and on a decision about what acts should be treated in this col-
lective manner.  At least to some extent, the decision to aggregate con-
duct of different defendants, and the decision to include or exclude spe-
cific acts in that aggregate unit, is likely to be a policy decision, or merely 
an intuitive selection.  In either case, it may generate further legal issues, 
this time over the criteria for the policy decisions.
32
Lacking any identifiable principle that justifies grouping the con-
duct of independent actors for causal purposes, this solution to the 
evidentiary problem has been summarily rejected by leading causal 
theorists.33  Only one court has expressly adopted evidential grouping, 
and it did so without fully understanding the underlying principle.34
31 See J.L. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE:  A STUDY OF CAUSATION 265-66 
(1974) (noting the distinction between two “kinds of cause:  producing causes and ex-
planatory causes”); Charles E. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 941, 
944-45 (1935) (proposing “a rule as to proof in the concurrent cause cases” where 
“proof of cause both in fact and law is relaxed” by allowing the plaintiff to establish 
these elements, in part, with evidence showing that her “injury did happen from one of 
the several or the collective operation of such independent causes, of which the de-
fendant’s was one”).  For the most extensive treatment of the grouping approach 
(dubbed “collective liability”), see ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 130-59 (2001).  Porat and Stein conclude that collective liability can be 
justified by considerations of corrective justice and deterrence under certain condi-
tions.  They do not otherwise identify the tort principle that would justify grouping the 
defendants for evidentiary purposes, but instead assume that there is a “well-identified 
group” of actors.  Id. at 131-32. 
32 DOBBS, supra note 11, § 171, at 417. 
33 E.g., Michael D. Green, The Intersection of Factual Causation and Damages, 55 
DEPAUL L. REV. 671, 682 (2006) (“[T]here is a certain, arbitrary quality to this ration-
ale that is troubling.  But for the torts of one of the hunters [in Summers] and another 
hunter on the other side of the county who fired carelessly and hit nothing, the victim 
would not have suffered harm.”); Wright, supra note 4, at 1780-81 (rejecting the 
Prosser and Keeton causal rule because it “cannot distinguish duplicative causes from 
preempted conditions” and “would treat totally unrelated conditions as causes”). 
34 See Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Iowa 1994) 
(agreeing with the causal rule articulated by Prosser and Keeton).  The Iowa Supreme 
Court had previously rejected market-share liability, partly for the reason that any 
modification of the causation requirement is a legislative decision.  See Mulcahy v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 75 (Iowa 1986) (rejecting “market share liability theory on 
a broad policy basis”).  Market-share liability, however, can be justified by evidential 
grouping for reasons given in Part II, infra.  The Spaur court’s adoption of evidential 
grouping, therefore, is inconsistent with the Mulcahy court’s prior rejection of market-
share liability, indicating that the Iowa Supreme Court did not understand fully the 
principle underlying evidential grouping. 
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Nevertheless, solving the causal problem by grouping the defen-
dants has obvious appeal.  It is the only rationale capable of explain-
ing how alternative liability does not relax the plaintiff’s burden of 
proving causation or otherwise provide compensation for the tortious 
exposure to risk.  Others have solved the causal problem in this man-
ner, and their failure to specify its underlying rationale does not mean 
it lacks one.  To understand adequately the rule of alternative liability, 
we need to determine whether there is a principle that justifies group-
ing a number of independent tortfeasors for the purpose of establish-
ing causation. 
B.  Evidential Grouping in a Principled Manner 
When one tortfeasor is responsible for the conduct of another, 
tort law groups the two together for liability purposes.  A co-
conspirator is liable for the tortious injuries caused by other co-
conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.35  One who aids and 
abets a tortfeasor is liable for the resultant injuries.36  An employer is 
vicariously liable for the torts committed by an employee within the 
scope of her employment.37  In each type of case, one tortfeasor incurs 
joint and several liability for an injury that was caused by another tort-
feasor’s conduct.  The two have acted as a group in causing the plain-
tiff’s injury, either in terms of the tortious conduct itself, as in cases of 
conspiracy or aiding and abetting, or in terms of a preexisting rela-
tionship, as in cases of vicarious liability.  By joining the group, each 
defendant tortfeasor becomes responsible for the tortious injuries 
proximately caused by the group, regardless of whether the defendant 
directly caused the harm. 
In contrast to liability grouping, tort law can rely upon less de-
manding forms of grouping for evidentiary purposes.  Unlike liability 
grouping, evidential grouping does not make a defendant responsible 
for the conduct of other tortfeasors, because there is nothing about 
any defendant’s conduct that warrants such responsibility.  One of the 
defendant shooters in Summers is simply not responsible for the con-
duct of the other defendant shooter; otherwise the case would involve 
a concert of action governed by liability grouping.  The plaintiff could 
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977) (describing when one is subject 
to liability for “harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of an-
other”). 
36 Id. 
37 DOBBS, supra note 11, § 333, at 905. 
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get full recovery from a single shooter as a member of the group, re-
gardless of whether that shooter actually shot the plaintiff.  But, even 
if each defendant is not responsible for the conduct of the other de-
fendants, it may still be justifiable to group their conduct for eviden-
tiary purposes.  The evidential grouping only supports the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case of liability, without making each defendant responsi-
ble or liable for the tortious conduct of the other defendants. 
To be justifiable, evidential grouping must redress an injustice 
that would otherwise be created by the ordinary evidentiary rule re-
quiring proof of but-for causation with respect to each individual de-
fendant.  A rule of this type would not treat defendants unfairly, for 
reasons given by Arthur Ripstein and Benjamin Zipursky: 
Any procedure is at best an imperfect way of realizing . . . justice in a 
world of uncertainty.  As a result, procedural rules may work an injustice 
in a particular case.  If they do, the party who would stand to benefit 
from that injustice cannot complain that he is being wronged if a court 
acts to prevent it.  For neither party to a lawsuit has the right to proce-
dures that favour him; at most each party has a right to procedures that 
are not unfair.
38
To evaluate evidential grouping in these terms, we need to con-
sider more closely the problem addressed by alternative liability.  In 
these cases, the plaintiff was tortiously harmed by one of the defen-
dants, but the available evidence does not enable the plaintiff to iden-
tify the actual tortfeasor.  The limited evidence creates an intractable 
problem of factual uncertainty. 
Tort law allocates factual uncertainty to the parties according to 
the burden of proof.  Ordinarily, the plaintiff must prove each ele-
ment of a tort, including causation, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, often called the more-likely-than-not evidentiary standard.39  
This standard allows for the possibility that some nonculpable or in-
nocent defendants will incur liability.  It also allows for the possibility 
that some deserving plaintiffs will not be compensated.  For example, 
suppose the plaintiff establishes all elements other than causation.  If 
the evidence conclusively shows there is a 50.1% chance that the de-
38 Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, 
in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214, 235 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).  Rip-
stein and Zipursky are expressly discussing corrective justice in this passage, but the 
point generalizes. 
39 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Persuasion in Civil Cases:  Algo-
rithms v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 897-904 (explaining why the burden 
of proof applies to each element individually rather than to the entire tort claim). 
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fendant caused the harm, the plaintiff can recover, despite a 49.9% 
chance that the defendant did not cause the harm.  Conversely, if the 
evidence conclusively shows that there is a 50.1% chance that the de-
fendant did not cause the harm, the plaintiff cannot recover, despite a 
49.9% chance that the defendant did cause the harm.  That is, the or-
dinary evidentiary standard expressly allows for a 49.9% chance that a 
defendant who did not actually cause the harm will be liable (a “false 
positive”) and a 49.9% chance that a defendant who did in fact cause 
the harm will avoid liability (a “false negative”). 
By giving equal treatment to false positives and false negatives, tort 
law has adopted a norm that gives equal weight or concern to (1) the 
interest of a nonculpable defendant in avoiding liability judgments 
based on limited factual information (a false positive), and (2) the in-
terest of a deserving plaintiff who cannot establish her right to com-
pensation only because of limited factual information (a false nega-
tive).  The tort norm, in other words, strives to apportion equally the 
burden of factual uncertainty or erroneous legal determinations be-
tween a nonculpable defendant and a deserving plaintiff.40
So understood, the tort norm governing the fair allocation of fac-
tual uncertainty neither requires nor forecloses proof applied to de-
fendants individually or as a group.  Consider the relevant interests at 
stake in the modified Summers case involving three identically situated 
defendant shooters.  When the causal evidence applies to the group of 
defendants, the plaintiff can prove that he was harmed by their tor-
tious conduct and is a deserving plaintiff.  As a factual matter, the 
plaintiff’s interest is appropriately characterized in this manner.  The 
evidence shows that the plaintiff was tortiously harmed and deserves 
compensation.  The only factual uncertainty involves the identity of 
the actual tortfeasor, creating the hard question of whether the uncer-
tainty prevents the otherwise deserving plaintiff from recovering 
against any individual defendant.  The factual uncertainty must be al-
located so that the interest of the deserving plaintiff is given the same 
weight as the interest of a nonculpable defendant, but this norm does 
not determine how the interests of the parties should be character-
ized.  Just as the nature of the plaintiff’s interest can be determined by 
the way in which the evidence applies to the group of defendants, the 
interest of each defendant can be similarly determined.  The issue in-
40 See, e.g., PORAT & STEIN, supra note 31, at 18, 37-42 (discussing the allocation of 
risk of error to promote equality and corrective justice in tort law). 
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volves a distinctive normative judgment—the one addressed by a prin-
ciple that justifies evidential grouping. 
This principle can be extracted from cases involving multiple tort-
feasors, each of whose conduct was sufficient to cause the harm in 
question.  The classic example involves two independent tortfeasors 
who negligently started separate fires that subsequently merged and 
destroyed the plaintiff’s property.41  Each fire was sufficient to cause 
the entirety of the plaintiff’s damage, and so the plaintiff cannot 
prove that either fire was a but-for cause of the injury.  If this form of 
causal proof were inadequate, the plaintiff would be denied recovery 
altogether, despite having proven that the injury was tortiously caused 
by the two defendants.  In these cases, “all courts impose liability on 
both tortfeasors without requiring ‘but for’ causation [as applied to 
each defendant individually].  Courts do this to avoid the obvious in-
justice of allowing each culpable tortfeasor to escape liability to an in-
nocent victim by hiding behind the negligence of the other tortfea-
sor.”42
In a set of analogous cases, one defendant tortiously caused the 
plaintiff’s harm, and then another defendant’s tortious conduct sub-
sequently duplicated part of that harm in an unrelated accident.  A 
leading example involves an initial tortfeasor permanently disabling 
the plaintiff’s leg in an automobile accident, and a second tortfeasor 
shooting the plaintiff in the leg a few years later, necessitating ampu-
tation of the leg.43  The second tortfeasor cannot be liable for the du-
plicated harm (permanent disability of the leg), because one cannot 
cause an injury that has already occurred.44  Only the first tortfeasor 
could be liable for the duplicated harm, but she can argue that the 
41 E.g., Anderson v. Minneapolis St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 
48 (Minn. 1920), overruled in part on other grounds by Borsheim v. Great N. Ry. Co., 183 
N.W. 519, 521 (Minn. 1921) (upholding the lower court’s instruction that if the fires 
combined to burn plaintiff’s property, the defendant is liable). 
42 David A. Fischer, Successive Causes and the Enigma of Duplicated Harm, 66 TENN. L. 
REV. 1127, 1129-30 (1999) (citations omitted); see also Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause:  
Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 966-68 
(2001) (arguing that the choice to impose the requirement of but-for causation in 
cases of overdetermined harm is a normative one). 
43 See Baker v. Willoughby, (1970) 2 W.L.R. 50, 58 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng. 
C.A.) (arguing that in such an accident, “[i]f the supervening event is a tort, the sec-
ond tortfeasor should be responsible for the additional devaluation caused by him”) 
(Pearson, L., concurring). 
44 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 cmt. h 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“Once the harm has occurred, any other cause 
that remains incomplete is not a cause of harm.”). 
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harm (permanent disability), more likely than not, would have oc-
curred anyway due to the other tortfeasor’s ensuing negligent conduct 
(requiring amputation).  This form of exculpatory proof has been re-
jected by the courts.  “Generally, courts hold the first tortfeasor liable 
for all the harm caused by the first accident, including the duplicated 
harm.”45  As in the two-fire cases, this rule avoids the injustice of ena-
bling all defendants to avoid liability due to the negligence of other 
defendants when the plaintiff’s proof shows that she was tortiously in-
jured by at least one of the defendants.46
The same principle applies to cases involving toxic substances and 
diseases.  As the Maryland Court of Appeals explained: 
In products liability involving asbestos, where the plaintiff has sufficiently 
demonstrated both lung disease resulting from exposure to asbestos and 
that the exposure was to the asbestos products of many different, but 
identified, suppliers, no supplier enjoys a causation defense solely on the 
ground that the plaintiff would probably have suffered the same disease 
from inhaling fibers originating from the products of other suppliers.
47
A defendant manufacturer cannot avoid liability merely because the 
injury, more likely than not, was caused by the defective products sold 
by the other defendants.  This rule is adopted by the Restatement 
(Third) for all cases involving toxic substances and diseases.48
All of these cases involve evidential grouping.  In each one, the 
plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was 
45 Fischer, supra note 42, at 1155.  “Although there is very little consideration of 
this situation in American case law, cases from Britain and Canada are in agreement.”  
Green, supra note 33, at 30. 
46 In the duplicated-harm cases, the second tortfeasor avoids liability due to the 
negligence of the first tortfeasor, but there is an important difference between the two 
parties.  The first actor’s tortious conduct is a necessary element in a set of sufficient 
causal conditions that were operating at the time of that conduct, making it a factual 
cause of the harm.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 
27 cmt. f (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“[T]he fact that the other person’s con-
duct is sufficient to cause the harm does not prevent the actor’s conduct from being a 
factual cause of the harm . . . .”).  Once the injury has already occurred, the second 
tortfeasor’s conduct is never necessary for the occurrence of injury, thus eliminating it 
as a cause of the harm.  Id. § 26 cmt. k (“An act or omission cannot be a factual cause 
of an outcome that has already occurred.”).  The requirement of causation accordingly 
absolves the second tortfeasor from liability, while enabling the plaintiff to receive full 
recovery for the duplicated harm from the first tortfeasor. 
47 Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 604 A.2d 445, 459 (Md. 1992). 
48 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 cmt. g 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“[S]ome of the person’s exposure may not have 
been a but-for cause of the disease.  Nevertheless, each of the exposures . . . is a factual 
cause of the person’s disease . . . .”). 
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injured by tortious conduct engaged in by the defendants, and that 
each defendant’s tortious conduct may have actually caused or con-
tributed to the injury.  Due to the circumstances of the case, the ordi-
nary evidentiary rule requiring proof of individualized, but-for causa-
tion would absolve each defendant from liability, even though the 
plaintiff has proven that each defendant may have caused the harm 
and at least one of them did.  To avoid this outcome, the courts allow 
the plaintiff to prove causation against the group of defendant tortfea-
sors, and then bar each defendant from relying on exculpatory evi-
dence showing that the injury, more likely than not, was caused by the 
tortious conduct of the other defendants, when that proof, as applied 
to each individual defendant, would deny recovery to the deserving 
plaintiff.  Once this exculpatory evidence is ruled out, a defendant can 
avoid liability only by showing that she either did not act tortiously or 
could not possibly have caused the harm.  This type of exculpatory 
proof excludes the defendant from the otherwise indistinguishable 
group of defendants that tortiously caused the harm.  Lacking such 
proof, each defendant shares liability for the plaintiff’s harm. 
To be sure, not all of these cases involve factual uncertainty, and 
many of them can be explained by a test that deems a particular factor 
to have caused an injury if it is a necessary element in a set of existing 
conditions that was independently sufficient to cause the harm.  The 
so-called NESS (Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set) test, for exam-
ple, identifies each of the two negligent fires as a tortious cause:  
“Each fire was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of existing antece-
dent conditions that contained it but not the other fire.”49  As this de-
scription suggests, the NESS test is hardly intuitive or easy to apply, 
particularly when compared to evidential grouping.50
More fundamentally, the NESS test cannot adequately explain 
some cases that involve evidential grouping.  In a leading example, 
one actor failed to repair a car’s defective brakes, and another actor 
then failed to apply the (defective) brakes while driving, thereby injur-
ing the plaintiff.51  The exercise of reasonable care by one actor, given 
the existing unreasonable conduct of the other, would make no dif-
49 Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush:  Duty, Causal Contribution, 
and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1104 (2001); see also supra 
note 46 (explaining how the duplicated-harm cases satisfy the NESS test). 
50 See David A. Fischer, Insufficient Causes, 94 KY. L.J. 277, 312-17 (2005-2006) 
(questioning the causal intuitions embodied in the NESS test). 
51 For one of the many invocations of this example, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 cmt. i (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
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ference.  Applying the defective brakes would not have prevented the 
injury, nor would the outcome change if the brakes had been fixed 
and then not applied by the driver.  The NESS test does not solve this 
causal problem.  The tortious conduct of one actor is never a neces-
sary element in a set of existing conditions that would be independ-
ently sufficient to cause the injury, yet the two actors clearly should in-
cur liability.52  The rationale for liability is supplied by evidential 
grouping, which enables the plaintiff to group the conduct of the two 
tortious actors for the purpose of proving causation.  The combined 
conduct clearly satisfies the but-for test of causation.  The combined 
tortious conduct is also a necessary element in a set of existing condi-
tions that are independently sufficient to cause the harm, further ex-
plaining why the plaintiff can prove causation.  As this example illus-
trates, the NESS test often requires normative judgment regarding the 
aggregation of causal forces, and a judgment of that type is supplied 
by evidential grouping.53
Evidential grouping accordingly requires some justification for 
why the plaintiff can prove causation against the group of defendants, 
thereby disabling a defendant from avoiding liability merely by relying 
upon the negligence of other defendants.  That justification involves 
the inconsistency that would be produced by this form of exculpatory 
proof. 
The plaintiff’s evidence shows that she was injured by the group 
of defendant tortfeasors, and that each defendant is a member of that 
group.  Unless a defendant rebuts this evidence, she cannot reasona-
bly deny that the plaintiff was harmed by one of the defendants, in-
cluding herself.  The defendant, therefore, cannot avoid liability 
merely by arguing that the other defendants, more likely than not, 
caused the harm, if that same argument would enable every other defendant 
to avoid liability.  In these circumstances, the defendant’s argument ef-
fectively denies that the plaintiff was harmed by any of the defendants, 
including herself, even though the defendant’s failure to rebut the 
plaintiff’s proof disables the defendant from denying liability on this 
basis.  To avoid this inconsistency, the defendant can only rely upon 
proof rebutting the plaintiff’s evidence.  Since the plaintiff’s evidence 
52 See Fischer, supra note 50, at 301-12 (analyzing this limitation of the NESS test in 
the context of successive omission cases). 
53 See id. at 288-89 (explaining why the NESS test involves a normative judgment 
about which forces to aggregate in constructing sufficient causal sets); see also infra 
notes 131-37 and accompanying text (explaining why the asbestos cases require evi-
dential grouping in order to satisfy the principle of causation). 
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shows that no single defendant, more likely than not, caused the 
harm, a defendant does not rebut the plaintiff’s proof merely by argu-
ing that she is not the probable cause of the harm.  A defendant must 
instead prove that she did not act tortiously or could not possibly have 
caused the injury, the only evidence directly rebutting the plaintiff’s 
proof.54
Moreover, when every defendant attempts to avoid liability by rely-
ing upon the negligence of other defendants, they are resorting to 
“naked statistics” rather than particularistic proof, but “[j]udges gen-
erally have refused to accept naked statistics or ex ante causal prob-
abilities as evidence of what actually happened on a particular occa-
sion.”55  The fact that the remaining group of defendants probably 
54 Professors Ripstein and Zipursky make a similar argument about market-share 
liability.  See Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 38, at 235 (arguing that the California Su-
preme Court in Sindell effectively “estopped” the defendants from an argument that 
would both “concede and deny their liability to each plaintiff”).  Ripstein and Zipursky 
explain that their account of market-share liability “can be understood as ensuring that 
defendants’ liabilities are (at least roughly) limited by the harm they did.”  Id. at 237.  
Their justification for market-share liability accordingly “requires a completed wrong,” 
making it inapplicable to alternative liability.  Id. at 240.  Unlike the account offered by 
Ripstein and Zipursky, my argument is that the principle in question justifies evidential 
grouping, which in turn does not require proof that each defendant completed a 
wrong by tortiously injuring someone. 
55 Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and 
Proof:  Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1050-51 
(1988) (citations omitted).  Proof by “naked statistics” apparently is ruled out when 
particularistic proof was otherwise reasonably available.  As Judge Posner has ex-
plained: 
Suppose . . . that a person is hit by a bus, and it is known that 51 percent of 
the buses on the road where he was hit are owned by Bus Company A and 49 
percent by Bus Company B.  He sues A and asks for judgment on the basis of 
this statistic alone; he presents no other evidence.  If the defendant also pre-
sents no evidence, should a jury be permitted to award judgment for the 
plaintiff?  The law answers “no.”  But this is not because of doubt about the 
evidentiary value of statistical evidence.  The true source of disquiet in the ex-
ample, we believe, is the tacit assumption that the statistic concerning the 
ownership of the buses is the only evidence the plaintiff can obtain.  If it is his 
only evidence, the inference to be drawn is not that there is a 51 percent prob-
ability that it was a bus owned by A that hit him but that he either investigated 
and discovered that it was actually a bus owned by B (which might be judg-
ment-proof and so not worth suing), or that he has simply not bothered to 
conduct an investigation.  In either event he should lose, in the first case ob-
viously and in the second because a court should not be required to expend 
any of its scarce resources of time and effort on a case until the plaintiff has 
conducted a sufficient search to indicate that an expenditure of public re-
sources is reasonably likely to yield a social benefit. 
U.S. v. Veysey, 334 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (citations omitted).  The 
plaintiff’s statistical proof in this hypothetical also inappropriately assumes that any 
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caused the injury does not explain what happened in this particular 
case, as it implies that no defendant caused the harm, and yet the 
plaintiff has provided uncontested proof to the contrary. 
As one court explained in a related context, such 
[q]uantitative probability . . . is only the greater chance.  It is not proof, 
nor even probative evidence, of the proposition to be proved.  That in 
one throw of dice there is a quantitative probability, or greater chance, 
that a less number of spots than sixes will fall uppermost is no evidence 
whatever that in a given throw such was the actual result.  Without some-
thing more, the actual result of the throw would still be utterly unknown.  
The slightest real [particularistic] evidence that sixes did in fact fall up-
permost would outweigh all the [naked] probability otherwise.
56
In the asbestos cases, for example, the plaintiff has provided par-
ticularistic evidence showing that each defendant belongs to the 
group of tortfeasors that caused the harm, whereas each defendant 
only relies upon “quantitative probability” or “the greater chance” that 
the other defendants caused the injury.  That evidence, however, is 
not probative of what actually happened on this particular occasion, 
since the evidence, when relied upon by each defendant, establishes 
that no one caused the harm, and that outcome is inconsistent with 
the plaintiff’s uncontested particularistic proof that she was, in fact, 
injured by at least one of the defendants.  To avoid liability, a defen-
dant must instead provide evidence rebutting the plaintiff’s particu-
larized proof; a defendant asbestos supplier must show that it did not 
sell a defective product, or that its defective product could not have 
caused the plaintiff’s harm.57
bus from either company is equally likely to have tortiously caused the harm.  How-
ever, if Bus Company A adopted safety procedures that considerably reduced the risk 
of negligent driving as compared to the procedures employed by Bus Company B, then 
the fact that Company A had fifty-one percent of the buses in town does not establish 
that it created a fifty-one percent chance of tortiously causing the harm.  The relative 
proportion of buses owned by the two companies—their “market share”—does not 
translate into a reliable measure of proportional risk, rendering the proof inadmissi-
ble.  Either interpretation explains why plaintiffs can prove causation of cancer with 
the “naked statistics” involved in epidemiologic study, as there is no other form of 
causal proof reasonably available in these cases and the statistics do not depend upon 
unproven assumptions regarding the risk.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. 
FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(3) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (identifying cir-
cumstances in which plaintiffs can prove causation with epidemiologic evidence in 
toxic tort cases).  For discussion of how this evidentiary requirement applies to the 
plaintiff’s proof of alternative liability, see infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text. 
56 Day v. Boston & Me. R.R., 52 A. 771, 774 (Me. 1902). 
57 See, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1220 (Cal. 1997) (holding 
that liability requires proof that the plaintiff’s exposure to inhalable asbestos fibers 
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A defendant can also avoid liability by proving that one (or more) 
of the other defendants was a but-for cause of the injury, as long as 
that same form of proof would not absolve all defendants of liability.  
The plaintiff then gets full recovery from the remaining group of de-
fendants proven to have caused the harm, an outcome consistent with 
her prima facie case of liability. 
Evidential grouping, therefore, is based upon the following prin-
ciple: 
Once the plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) each de-
fendant may have tortiously caused the harm, (2) one or more of the defendants 
did actually cause the harm, and (3) each defendant would be subject to liability 
for having actually caused or contributed to the harm, then no defendant can 
avoid liability by relying upon the tortious conduct of the other defendants, when 
that form of exculpatory causal proof would enable all of the defendants to avoid 
liability. 
To invoke this principle, the plaintiff must satisfy the ordinary 
burden of proving that each defendant is responsible for a tortious 
risk that may have actually caused or contributed to the harm.  In or-
der for this proof to establish the plaintiff’s prima facie case, each de-
fendant must also be subject to liability in the event that her tortious 
conduct actually caused or contributed to the harm.58  With respect to 
the element of causation, the plaintiff must satisfy the ordinary bur-
den of proof against the group of defendants.  More likely than not, 
the two tortious fires caused the plaintiff’s harm, entitling the plaintiff 
to receive compensation from the two defendant wrongdoers.  More 
likely than not, the asbestos supplied by the group of defendant 
manufacturers caused the plaintiff’s harm, entitling the plaintiff to 
receive compensation from the group of defendant wrongdoers.  
Once the plaintiff has satisfied this burden of proof, she has estab-
lished a prima facie case of liability, enabling courts to shift the bur-
den of disproving causation to each individual defendant. 
When defendants are grouped in a principled manner, the liabil-
ity rule does not suffer from the problems that others have attributed 
to it, such as the following: 
[C]onsider the case in which C poisons P’s tea and D shoots P before P 
drinks the tea.  Assume also that B was climbing Mt. Everest.  Clearly, D’s 
shooting P was a preemptive cause of P’s death, and neither C’s poison-
from the defendant’s product was a “substantial factor[] increasing the risk of can-
cer”). 
58 See infra note 126 (illustrating the role of this requirement). 
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ing the tea nor B’s climbing Mt. Everest was a cause.  The proposed test, 
however, would treat all three activities as causes.  In the aggregate they 
were a but-for cause of P’s death, while individually none of them was a 
but-for cause.
59
The test proposed here would not treat all three defendants as 
causes of the harm, because there is no principled reason for doing 
so.  Established tort principles enable B to avoid liability, as she did 
not owe or breach a duty of care to the plaintiff and, in any case, there 
is no factual uncertainty regarding her lack of causal connection to 
the injury.  The facts conclusively show that B did not tortiously cause 
the harm.  (Indeed, the plaintiff would be subject to sanction for fil-
ing suit against B on these facts.)  Similarly, there is no factual uncer-
tainty regarding C’s causal connection to the injury.  “No serious con-
troversy exists over the proposition that a tortious act that occurs after 
harm has already happened cannot be a factual cause of the harm.”60  
The plaintiff was killed before drinking the tea poisoned by C, elimi-
nating any possibility that C actually caused the wrongful death.  Lack-
ing any causal connection to the plaintiff’s harm, the evidence does 
not justify the inclusion of C within any group of culpable defendants 
that actually caused the harm.  Doing so would violate the fundamen-
tal tort requirement of causation.  The only remaining defendant, D, 
is subject to liability for having tortiously caused the plaintiff’s death 
under the established tort principle involving the liability of a first 
tortfeasor for tortiously caused duplicated harms.61  The plaintiff gets 
full recovery from D; there is no factual uncertainty creating the type 
of injustice requiring redress by evidential grouping. 
Evidential grouping has been rejected by one court on the ground 
that the plaintiff must always satisfy the ordinary burden of proving 
that each defendant caused the injury.62  That jurisdiction, however, 
had previously adopted alternative liability,63 rendering invalid this 
reason for rejecting evidential grouping.  Alternative liability has only 
two plausible evidentiary interpretations:  (1) It either absolves the 
plaintiff from the ordinary burden of proving that each individual de-
fendant caused the physical harm, or (2) it requires the plaintiff to 
59 Wright, supra note 4, at 1781. 
60 Green, supra note 33, at 680 n.30. 
61 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
62 See Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1461 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying Ne-
braska law; mandating that the plaintiff prove that “each liable defendant [was] a but-
for and substantial contributor to the indivisible injury”). 
63 Id. at 1460. 
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satisfy the ordinary evidentiary burden with respect to causation 
against the group of defendants.64  By adopting alternative liability, a 
jurisdiction has accordingly either implicitly adopted evidential group-
ing or decided that the plaintiff does not always have to satisfy the or-
dinary burden of proving that each defendant caused the physical 
harm.  In such a jurisdiction, evidential grouping cannot be persua-
sively rejected on the ground that a plaintiff must always satisfy the or-
dinary burden of proving that each defendant actually caused the 
harm. 
C.  Evidential Grouping as the Basis for Alternative Liability 
Alternative liability can be interpreted as a rule that relaxes the 
plaintiff’s burden of proof or otherwise provides compensation for 
mere risk exposure.65  These interpretations are problematic, though, 
because they are inconsistent with other bodies of tort law.  As the di-
vided case law on market-share liability shows, courts apparently are 
unwilling to reduce a plaintiff’s burden of proving causation or to al-
low a plaintiff to recover for mere exposure to tortious risk, condi-
tional upon the occurrence of injury.66
When based on evidential grouping, alternative liability neither 
reduces the plaintiff’s burden of proof nor provides compensation for 
mere risk exposure.  Evidential grouping explains why alternative li-
ability can satisfy the requirement of causation that is fundamental to 
tort law. 
This conclusion does not show that alternative liability is based 
upon evidential grouping, however.  Even though evidential grouping 
makes alternative liability consistent with other bodies of tort law, it is 
a separate question whether the courts have understood alternative 
liability in these terms.  To serve as the basis for alternative liability, 
evidential grouping must also persuasively explain how courts have 
conceptualized alternative liability. 
The California Supreme Court did not expressly adopt evidential 
grouping in Summers v. Tice, but its rationale for alternative liability 
clearly depends upon the principle of evidential grouping.  As the 
court explained in a later case, “[t]he fundamental justification for a 
Summers-type shift of the burden is that without it all defendants might 
64 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
65 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
66 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
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escape liability and the plaintiff be left ‘remediless.’”67  This statement 
is overly broad.  A plaintiff who is unable to satisfy the burden of proof 
typically is left without a remedy.  Unlike these cases, however, the 
plaintiff in Summers proved that he was deserving of a remedy.  He 
proved that he was tortiously injured, and that each defendant may 
have been the actual cause of the harm, in which case that defendant 
would be liable for the plaintiff’s injury.  Given this proof, it would be 
an injustice if the plaintiff were left “remediless” merely because each 
defendant could argue that he was not the most probable cause of the 
harm.  That result violates the principle of evidential grouping.  Ac-
cording to that principle, each defendant cannot avoid liability by re-
lying upon the tortious conduct of other defendants when that form 
of exculpatory proof would enable all of the defendants to avoid liabil-
ity, despite the plaintiff’s proof that each defendant may have tor-
tiously caused the harm, and at least one of them did.  This type of ar-
gument was relied upon by each of the defendants in Summers and 
rejected by the court.  The principle of evidential grouping straight-
forwardly explains why the “fundamental justification” for “a Summers-
type shift of the burden is that without it all defendants might escape 
liability and the plaintiff be left ‘remediless.’” 
The court’s reliance on evidential grouping is more clearly re-
flected in its description of the evidence:  “[W]e believe it is clear that 
the [trial] court sufficiently found on the issue that defendants were 
jointly liable and that thus the negligence of both was the cause of the injury 
or to that legal effect.”68
The Summers court relied upon evidential grouping in yet another 
way: 
 When we consider the relative position of the parties and the results 
that would flow if plaintiff was required to pin the injury on one of the 
defendants only, a requirement that the burden of proof on that subject 
be shifted to defendants becomes manifest.  They are both wrongdo-
ers—both negligent toward plaintiff.  They brought about a situation 
where the negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff, hence it 
should rest with them each to absolve himself if he can.  The injured 
party has been placed by defendants in the unfair position of pointing to 
which defendant caused the harm.  If one can escape the other may also 
and plaintiff is remediless.  Ordinarily defendants are in a far better po-
sition to offer evidence to determine which one caused the injury.  This 
67 Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1220 (Cal. 1997) (citing Summers 
v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948)). 
68 Summers, 199 P.2d at 2 (emphasis added). 
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reasoning has recently found favor in this Court.  In a quite analogous 
situation this Court held that a patient injured while unconscious on an 
operating table in a hospital could hold all or any of the persons who 
had any connection with the operation even though he could not select 
the particular acts by the particular person which led to his disability.  
There the Court was considering whether the patient could avail himself 
of res ipsa loquitur, rather than where the burden of proof lay, yet the 
effect of the decision is that plaintiff has made out a case when he has 
produced evidence which gives rise to an inference of negligence which 
was the proximate cause of the injury.  It is up to defendants to explain 
the cause of the injury.  It was there said:  “If the doctrine is to continue 
to serve a useful purpose, we should not forget that ‘the particular force 
and justice of the rule, regarded as a presumption throwing upon the 
party charged the duty of producing evidence, consists in the circum-
stance that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or in-
nocent, is practically accessible to him but inaccessible to the injured 
person.’”  Similarly in the instant case plaintiff is not able to establish which of 
defendants caused his injury.
69
This passage refers to the well-known case, Ybarra v. Spangard,70 the 
only California case relied upon by the Summers court to justify af-
firmatively why the plaintiff had satisfied the burden of proof on cau-
sation.  The passage suggests that a rationale for alternative liability 
involves the defendants’ better access to evidence.  But neither defen-
dant in Summers had better access to the evidence than the plaintiff, 
and the passage ultimately frames the analogy to Ybarra solely in terms 
of the plaintiff’s inability “to establish which of defendants caused his 
injury” that was proven to have been tortiously caused by one of them.  
In order for the two cases to be “quite analogous” in this respect, they 
must be based upon a grouping principle that redresses an injustice 
created by the defendants’ conduct. 
In Summers, the defendants can be grouped for causal purposes 
because each defendant’s tortious conduct may have caused the plain-
tiff’s harm, and one of them did.  In Ybarra, the plaintiff could not 
prove that each defendant had acted negligently.71  The Ybarra court, 
though, expressed a different rationale for why the defendants’ con-
duct made it appropriate to group them for evidentiary purposes:  
“Plaintiff was rendered unconscious for the purpose of undergoing 
surgical treatment by the defendants; it is manifestly unreasonable for 
them to insist that he identify any one of them as the person who did 
69 Id. at 4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
70 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944) (en banc). 
71 Id. at 688. 
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the alleged negligent act.”72  Since the defendants acted together as a 
group in providing surgical treatment to the plaintiff, and since the 
nature of their conduct made it impossible for the plaintiff to identify 
the individual tortfeasor, the defendants’ conduct provided a suffi-
cient reason to group them for evidentiary purposes.73  The Ybarra jus-
tification for grouping the defendants clearly differed from the justifi-
cation in Summers, but in both cases evidential grouping was required 
in order to avoid the injustice of barring the deserving plaintiff from 
recovery solely because the nature of the defendants’ conduct made it 
unreasonably difficult for the plaintiff to identify the actual tortfeasor.  
In each case, a defendant could avoid liability only by proving that he 
or she was not a tortfeasor who may have caused the harm; the type of 
proof showing that the defendant did not belong to the group of cul-
pable tortfeasors.74  Evidential grouping explains why the Summers 
court found Ybarra to be “quite analogous.” 
This interpretation also explains why alternative liability limits the 
form of exculpatory causal proof available to the defendants, an ex-
planation otherwise lacking in the Restatement rationales for the rule.75  
When the causal issue is framed in terms of the group of defendants, a 
defendant cannot admit that she could have tortiously caused the 
harm and then exculpate herself solely on the ground that the factual 
uncertainty means that the remaining group of defendants, more 
72 Id. at 690. 
73 In citing to Ybarra and other cases, one California court expressly described the 
rule in grouping terms: 
A group of [independent] persons and instrumentalities may combine in the 
performance of a medical procedure culminating in an unexpected, mysteri-
ous and disastrous result.  With the sources of disaster personified in a group 
of defendants, the demand for evidence pointing the finger of probability at 
any one of them is relaxed; all may be called upon to give the jury evidence of 
care. 
Inouye v. Black, 47 Cal. Rptr. 313, 316 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (citations omitted).  
Cf. Saul Levmore, Gomorrah to Ybarra and More:  Overextraction and the Puzzle of Immoder-
ate Group Liability, 81 VA. L. REV. 1561, 1565-75 (1995) (interpreting the group liability 
in Ybarra as “bending the requirements for vicarious liability” and drawing support for 
such grouping from products liability cases in which the manufacturer of a finished 
product incurs liability for a defect in an unidentifiable component part produced by 
another manufacturer). 
74 Therefore, the liability in Ybarra was not based upon a theory of defendants’ 
concert of action such as conspiracy, as these forms of liability do not enable a defen-
dant to exculpate herself on the ground that another defendant caused the harm.  See 
supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (describing the rules of co-conspiracy, aiding 
and abetting, and vicarious liability). 
75 See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. 
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likely than not, caused the injury.  This proof merely shows that the 
harm was caused by the group of tortfeasors and that the defendant is 
a member of the group.  To avoid liability on causal grounds, a de-
fendant must instead provide evidence excluding herself from the 
causal group.  This reasoning explains why the Restatement (Third) can 
summarily conclude that: 
Defendants would be able to satisfy their burden of production when 
three or more defendants are subject to alternative liability in one of two 
ways:  a defendant might show why it was not the cause of plaintiff’s in-
jury or it might show which one of the other defendants was the cause.
76
These two forms of proof are the only ones that would exclude the de-
fendant from the causal group. 
Once the causal issue is evaluated in group terms, it also becomes 
apparent why the Restatement (Third) rationale for alternative liability—
that as between a “culpable” defendant and “innocent” plaintiff, the 
“risk of error” should be put on the defendant—is applicable only to 
cases involving multiple defendants and not a single defendant.77  In-
sofar as alternative liability involves the grouping of defendants for 
causal purposes, it depends upon a principle that is not relevant to 
cases involving a single defendant. 
Alternative liability can rely upon evidential grouping without 
“generat[ing] further legal issues . . . over the criteria for the policy 
decisions,” contrary to the claim of a leading treatise.78  Without ques-
tion, the grouping of defendants for evidentiary purposes requires a 
normative or policy judgment.  The policy judgment in Summers dif-
fers from that in Ybarra—the former involves tortious conduct en-
gaged in by all defendants, whereas the latter does not.  In Summers 
and related cases of alternative liability, the judgment has already 
been made by tort law in analogous contexts, like those involving mul-
tiple tortious fires or multiple asbestos suppliers.  New policy issues 
might be created by the type of grouping involved in Ybarra, but that 
form of grouping is not required for purposes of alternative liability. 
To be sure, alternative liability requires a distinctive policy judg-
ment—it makes liable one or more of the defendants who did not ac-
76 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 reporters’ 
note cmt. j (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
77 Id. cmt. f (stating that this justification for alternative liability is not based on 
“consideration of the single-defendant case in which plaintiff can prove tortious con-
duct but is unable to prove factual causation”). 
78 DOBBS, supra note 11, § 171, at 417. 
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tually cause the plaintiff’s harm.  The possibility of such legal error 
does not violate the tort norm regarding the fair allocation of factual 
uncertainty, however, insofar as the proof identifies the plaintiff as be-
ing deserving of compensation and each of the defendants as being 
presumptively culpable.  The defendants could be deemed culpable 
by virtue of having exposed the plaintiff to tortious risk, but that con-
ception of the plaintiff’s tort right has not been widely adopted by the 
courts.  The defendants, more plausibly, are presumptively culpable 
by virtue of evidential grouping. 
Prior to the adoption of alternative liability, evidential grouping 
was limited to cases in which each defendant’s tortious conduct was 
either a necessary or sufficient condition for the harm.79  In Summers, 
only one defendant’s tortious conduct actually caused the injury, mak-
ing the other defendant’s tortious conduct neither a necessary nor 
sufficient condition for the occurrence of the harm.  Evidential group-
ing, however, makes each defendant responsible for the way in which 
his tortious conduct interacted with the tortious conduct of the other 
defendant.80  The two defendants interacted to create impenetrable 
factual uncertainty regarding the identity of the shooter who actually 
hit the plaintiff, making the two defendants responsible for the uncer-
tainty.  Unable to eliminate the uncertainty, each defendant had to 
share responsibility for the injury.  Each defendant’s responsibility for 
his tortious risk justified his own liability, but the liability itself re-
79 See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text. 
80 Underlying this form of liability is a conception of outcome-responsibility that 
has received the most extensive elaboration from Stephen Perry: 
 The normative power of this conception of outcome-responsibility resides in 
the idea that the exercise of a person’s positive agency, under circumstances 
in which a harmful outcome could have been foreseen and avoided, leads us 
to regard her as the author of the outcome.  Others can appropriately say of 
her, and she can say of herself, that she did it, and this is true even if other 
factors (some of which might be the acts of other persons) also causally con-
tributed to the harm.  The agent acted and caused harm under circumstances 
in which she had a sufficient degree of control to avoid its occurrence, and for 
that reason she has a special responsibility for the outcome that other persons 
do not have.  That we view outcome-responsibility as reason-affecting in this 
way is part of our deepest self-understanding of what it means to be a moral 
agent capable of both acting in the world and acknowledging responsibility 
for what one has done. 
Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY 
AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 38, at 72, 92-93 (footnote omitted).  If the harm 
were not foreseeable in Summers, the defendants would have avoided liability on that 
basis. 
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quired much more than just the tortious infliction of risk, conditional 
upon the occurrence of injury. 
Once alternative liability is justified in this way, it becomes evident 
why the Restatement (Third) can defensibly conclude that the “rationale 
for shifting the burden of proof to defendants whose tortious conduct 
exposed the plaintiff to a risk of harm is that, as between two culpable 
defendants and an innocent plaintiff, it is preferable to put the risk of 
error on the culpable defendants.”81  The Restatement formulation of 
alternative liability turns out to be fully persuasive, once conceptual-
ized in terms of evidential grouping. 
II.  MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY AND EVIDENTIAL GROUPING 
The doctrine of market-share liability originated in cases involving 
the unpatented, synthetic drug DES, which manufacturers first mar-
keted for use by pregnant women in 1947.82  After millions of preg-
nant women had taken DES, the Food and Drug Administration 
banned this use of the drug in 1971.  Researchers had found that the 
drug can cause vaginal cancer and other reproductive-organ anoma-
lies in the offspring of mothers who ingested DES during pregnancy.  
Throughout the entire period when manufacturers were marketing 
DES to pregnant women, these risks may have been foreseeable.  For 
decades, medical journals had provided evidence of the drug’s haz-
ards, and the manufacturers may also have been able to identify the 
risks by adequate testing.  A warning that did not apprise consumers 
of any such foreseeable risk would render DES a defective product.83  
Approximately 300 companies may have produced the drug during 
this period, although the exact number is uncertain.  The market was 
quite fluid, with manufacturers frequently entering and exiting the 
market.  The drug was truly generic and typically had no meaningful 
brand identification.  Each manufacturer sold DES of identical com-
position, and pharmacists usually filled prescriptions with whatever 
brand was on the shelf.  The lack of brand identity makes it difficult 
for the plaintiff to identify the actual product seller under any circum-
81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. f (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
82 For an insightful and thorough discussion of the DES litigation, see Anita Bern-
stein, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co.: Markets of Mothers, in TORTS STORIES 151, 151-78 
(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).  See also Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989). 
83 See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 134-56 (2006) (de-
scribing the liability rules governing warning defects). 
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stances, but the problem is even worse in the DES cases.  After the 
plaintiff’s mother purchased and ingested the DES, decades passed 
before the plaintiff offspring suffered injury; consequently, DES plain-
tiffs usually cannot identify which particular manufacturer sold the 
drug that caused his or her injury.  The plaintiff can use the manufac-
turer’s market share as a proxy for the probability that it actually 
caused the plaintiff’s harm, but each manufacturer had only a small 
market share.  By relying on market-share data, the plaintiff cannot 
prove that a particular manufacturer, more likely than not, caused the 
injury.  The causation requirement would appear to bar DES plaintiffs 
from recovery, thereby immunizing DES manufacturers from liability 
for the widespread injuries caused by their defective products. 
This evidentiary problem is addressed by the rule of alternative li-
ability.  Each defendant manufacturer exposed the plaintiff to the 
same tortious risk by supplying the same defective product in the rele-
vant market, just as each defendant in Summers exposed the plaintiff to 
the same tortious risk by negligently firing at him.  Only one manufac-
turer was the factual cause of the plaintiff’s harm, just as only one 
shooter in Summers injured the plaintiff.  However, the nature of the 
tortious conduct engaged in by each manufacturer (the sale of a ge-
neric, defective product) and the resulting harm (cancer or other in-
jury occurring long after exposure to the defect) have made it unrea-
sonably difficult for the plaintiff to identify which particular 
manufacturer caused the harm—the same type of evidentiary problem 
confronted by the plaintiff in Summers. 
To establish alternative liability, the plaintiff must join all poten-
tial tortfeasors in the lawsuit, as in Summers.84  Due to the large num-
ber of DES manufacturers, the fluid nature of the market, and the 
passage of time, this requirement is virtually impossible to satisfy.  
“[P]laintiffs’ inability to join all tortfeasor participants has prompted 
84 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM  § 28 cmt. g 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“Courts have insisted that all persons whose tor-
tious acts exposed the plaintiff to a risk of harm be joined as defendants as a condition 
for alternative liability.”).  The joinder requirement further explains why alternative 
liability is not a rule that compensates the plaintiff for risk rather than injury.  If the 
Summers doctrine involves compensation for risk rather than injury, then the plaintiff 
could sue only one shooter and show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that this 
individual defendant created a fifty percent chance of causing injury.  The proof would 
sufficiently establish liability for the risk, conditional upon the occurrence of injury.  
This outcome is barred by the joinder requirement, providing further support for the 
conclusion that alternative liability does not involve compensation for risk. 
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the dismissal of the alternative liability count of several multiple-party 
actions involving DES.”85
But why does the plaintiff have to join all of the potential tortfea-
sors?  As an evidentiary matter, the alternative liability cases like Sum-
mers are indistinguishable from the DES cases in which the plaintiff is 
unable to sue all of the manufacturers.  In both cases, the plaintiff was 
injured by tortious conduct, each of the defendants could have been 
the actual tortfeasor who would be subject to liability, and the nature 
of their misconduct has made it unreasonably difficult for the plaintiff 
to identify the actual tortfeasor.  The only difference involves the in-
ability of the DES plaintiff to join all of the potential tortfeasors, but 
like the other problems faced by the plaintiff, this one was also cre-
ated by the defendants’ conduct.  Why should this difference matter? 
The joinder requirement is not plausibly attributable to the con-
cern about unfairly reducing the plaintiff’s burden of proof.  Suppose 
the plaintiff sues a group of six DES manufacturers, each of which had 
ten percent of the relevant market, and can prove, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that each individual defendant sold a defective 
product (DES) that could have caused her injury.  This evidence does 
not prove that any individual defendant, more likely than not, was the 
actual injurer.  The evidence does show, however, that the group of 
DES manufacturers, more likely than not, caused the injury.  When 
considered in relation to the group of defendants, the plaintiff has es-
tablished causation by a preponderance of the evidence, the amount 
of evidence ordinarily required by tort law. 
This form of causal proof can be justified by the principle of evi-
dential grouping.  The evidence shows that each DES manufacturer 
may have tortiously caused the plaintiff’s harm, and would be subject 
to liability if it actually caused the harm, and that the group of defen-
dants, more likely than not, actually caused the harm.  On these facts, 
the “combined conduct [of the defendants], viewed as a whole, is a 
but-for cause of the event, and application of the but-for rule to them 
individually would absolve all of them.”86  To avoid this injustice, the 
liability rule can be formulated in terms of evidential grouping.  The 
only exculpatory evidence for each defendant is based solely upon the 
likelihood that the remaining defendants caused the injury.  Tort law 
has ruled out this type of exculpatory causal proof in analogous con-
85 2 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 24:4, at 
652 (3d ed. 2000). 
86 KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 41, at 268. 
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texts, and can do so here.87  A DES manufacturer cannot avoid liability 
by “hiding behind” the tortious conduct of other DES manufacturers 
when doing so would bar a deserving plaintiff from recovery alto-
gether.  The manufacturer must instead prove that it was not a mem-
ber of the group that tortiously caused the plaintiff’s harm. 
Liability in our hypothetical DES case therefore does not require 
any reduction in the plaintiff’s burden of proof, leaving the problem 
of excessive liability as the only persuasive reason for requiring the 
plaintiff to join all potential tortfeasors in the lawsuit.  If our hypo-
thetical DES plaintiff could establish alternative liability by joining 
sixty percent of the market, then the group of manufacturers would 
be jointly liable for the entirety of the plaintiff’s injury.  Such liability 
would result in each of the six defendants incurring liability for one-
sixth of the plaintiff’s injury, whereas each had only ten percent of the 
market.  A defendant would incur excessive liability, then, if its liability 
should be limited by the ten percent likelihood that it actually caused 
the plaintiff’s injury. 
In deciding upon the fair amount of liability, the court must com-
pare the interest of the DES plaintiff who has established a right to re-
ceive compensation for the injury from the group of defendants, and 
the interest of each individual defendant as a member of the group.88  
The compensatory demands that the plaintiff can fairly place upon 
each member of the group depend upon that individual defendant’s 
relation to the group.  An individual who is responsible for the 
group’s conduct can be held liable for the entire injury caused by the 
group, as in cases involving a concert of action among the defen-
dants.89  But in the DES cases, each individual manufacturer is not re-
sponsible for the group’s conduct; the sale of DES by one manufac-
turer does not make it responsible for the sales made by other DES 
87 See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text. 
88 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 487 (Cal. 1988) (identifying the 
“goal of achieving a balance between the interests of DES plaintiffs and manufacturers 
of the drug”). 
89 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977) (stating that a defendant is 
“subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to 
a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach 
of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct 
himself”).  Similarly, an individual defendant can be responsible for the group’s con-
duct under the theory of enterprise liability.  See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & 
Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 376-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding all manufacturers in a specific 
industry liable when the plaintiff is unable to identify the specific manufacturer that 
caused the harm, and the industry jointly controlled the risk). 
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manufacturers.  Consequently, the group is defined exclusively in 
causal terms—the likelihood that it caused the plaintiff’s injury.  Each 
individual defendant is a member of the causal group only by virtue of 
its responsibility for an independent tortious risk that may have in-
jured the plaintiff.  Each defendant’s contribution to the total risk of 
injury created by the group, therefore, defines the extent of its re-
sponsibility for the group’s conduct.  In apportioning damages for the 
plaintiff’s injury, the court can accordingly limit the liability of each 
defendant to the probability that its tortious conduct actually injured 
the plaintiff.  Under this method of apportionment, the interest of the 
DES plaintiff who has established a right to receive compensation for 
the injury from the group of defendants exactly corresponds to the 
interest of each individual defendant as a member of the causal 
group. 
This reasoning explains why courts insist that alternative liability 
requires joinder of all the potential tortfeasors.  Alternative liability 
gives the plaintiff one hundred percent compensation for the injury 
from the defendants.  When the joinder requirement has been satis-
fied, the proportional liability of each defendant adds up to one hun-
dred percent.  The imposition of joint liability on the group of all po-
tential tortfeasors lets the plaintiff receive full compensation for the 
injury without requiring any individual defendant to incur liability in 
excess of the probability that it actually caused the injury.90
We are now in a position to see how the California Supreme Court 
could defensibly “ground[]” market-share liability “upon an extension 
of the Summers doctrine” by modifying alternative liability to account 
for the problem of excessive liability.91  The issue is complicated, and 
the court’s reasoning is often not fully developed, but its opinions 
provide the necessary logic for the argument. 
Since the plaintiff could not join all potential tortfeasors as re-
quired by alternative liability, the court held that the plaintiff must in-
stead join a “substantial share” of the market in order to establish 
market-share liability.92  Properly applied, this requirement ensures 
that the group of DES defendants, more likely than not, caused the 
90 See infra notes 120-122, and accompanying text (explaining why alternative li-
ability does not require pro rata liability). 
91 See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928, 936-37 (Cal. 1980) (extending the 
Summers doctrine to allow the plaintiff’s action to be tried). 
92 See id. at 937 (holding that “only that a substantial percentage is required,” 
rather than seventy-five to eighty percent of the market).  The court subsequently re-
ferred to this requirement as involving a “substantial share” of the market.  Id. 
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plaintiff’s injury.93  Once the plaintiff has satisfied this requirement 
and all of the other remaining requirements for alternative liability, 
she has established a right to receive compensation for the injury from 
the group of defendants.  Alternative liability would make the defen-
dants jointly liable for the entire injury, resulting in an unfairly exces-
sive amount of liability for each individual defendant.94  Each of the 
DES defendants in our hypothetical case had only ten percent of the 
market, and so each should be liable for ten percent of the plaintiff’s 
injury—the amount representing each defendant’s responsibility (in-
dividual risk creation) for the group’s conduct (the total tortious risk 
imposed on the plaintiff).  To “protect . . . defendants against exces-
sive liability,” the court in a later case concluded that market-share li-
ability involves several liability, with the liability of each DES defen-
dant being limited by the probability that it actually caused the 
plaintiff’s injury—an amount defined by its market share.95  Each of 
the DES defendants in our hypothetical case had ten percent of the 
market, making each severally liable for ten percent of the plaintiff’s 
injury. 
Having altered the rule of alternative liability in these two re-
spects, the court could defensibly conclude that market-share liability 
is “an adaptation of the rule in Summers which will substantially over-
come [the] difficulties” faced by a plaintiff who cannot join every po-
tential tortfeasor in the lawsuit.96  Market-share liability does not fully 
overcome this difficulty, since the plaintiff receives compensation for 
only sixty percent of the injury in our hypothetical case.  The plain-
tiff’s recovery is limited by the rule of several liability, which makes the 
individual manufacturer responsible only for the defective products it 
actually sold.  This limitation of liability is required, according to the 
93 Sindell says that the substantial-share requirement “significantly diminishe[s]” 
the “injustice of shifting the burden of proof to defendants to demonstrate that they 
could not have made the substance which injured plaintiff.”  Id.  Insofar as the substan-
tial-share requirement means that the plaintiff must satisfy the ordinary burden of 
proof regarding causation against the group of defendants, then the satisfaction of this 
requirement makes it fair to shift the burden of proof to the defendants.  Cf. Murphy v. 
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247, 255 (Cal. 1985) (concluding that the substan-
tial-share requirement is not satisfied by ten percent of the market); Sindell, 607 P.2d at 
937 (indicating that the substantial-share requirement is less than seventy-five to eighty 
percent of the market). 
94 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 487 (Cal. 1988) (describing joint li-
ability as frustrating the “goal of achieving a balance between the interests of DES 
plaintiffs and manufacturers of the drug”). 
95 Id. at 486. 
96 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 931. 
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court, in order to avoid the unfairness that would arise if “one manu-
facturer would be held responsible for the products of another or for 
those of all other manufacturers if plaintiff ultimately prevails.”97  The 
plaintiff can prove causation by reference to the group of manufac-
turers, but the extent of each defendant’s responsibility for the 
group’s conduct is limited by its contribution to the total risk of injury 
created by the group—the same outcome achieved by alternative li-
ability. 
Unlike California, other jurisdictions have adopted markedly dif-
ferent formulations of market-share liability.98  The New York Court of 
Appeals, for example, adopted a rule of market-share liability that 
does not let the manufacturer exculpate itself from liability by proving 
that it did not sell the DES that injured the plaintiff.99  The rule of 
market-share liability in Wisconsin is based upon the national product 
market because of its “fluid” nature and the fact that each DES manu-
facturer “contributed to the risk of injury to the public and, conse-
quently, the risk of injury to individual plaintiffs.”100  Under this rule, 
the DES plaintiff can recover full damages for the entire injury from a 
single manufacturer in the national market, although “a defendant 
could escape liability if it proved by a preponderance of evidence that 
the DES it produced or marketed could not have reached the plain-
tiff’s mother.”101
The liability rules in New York and Wisconsin cannot be justified 
by Summers-type evidential grouping.  In Summers, evidential grouping 
depended on the principle that each defendant could not avoid liabil-
ity by relying upon the tortious conduct of other defendants, when 
that form of exculpatory proof would enable all of the defendants to 
avoid liability, contrary to the plaintiff’s proof that each defendant 
may have tortiously caused the harm, and at least one of them did.  
This principle does not apply when the plaintiff cannot prove that 
each defendant may have been the actual cause of the harm.  Proof 
that a DES manufacturer’s products were only distributed in Califor-
nia does not show that it caused any injuries in New York or Wiscon-
97 Id. at 938. 
98 For an overview of the varied approaches, see 2 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., supra 
note 85, at § 24. 
99 See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (adopting a 
market-share theory using a national market to apportion liability based upon “the 
amount of risk of injury each defendant created to the public-at-large”). 
100 Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 48-49 (Wis. 1984) (footnote omitted). 
101 Thomas ex rel. Gromling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 550 (Wis. 2005). 
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sin.  By holding the California manufacturer liable, the rule of market-
share liability in New York does not depend upon the principle that 
justifies evidential grouping in cases of alternative liability like Sum-
mers.  By adopting an expansive definition of risk exposure, the Wis-
consin rule arguably adheres to evidential grouping, but then violates 
that principle by subjecting a single defendant manufacturer to liabil-
ity for the entire harm, an amount in excess of its market share. 
The California, New York, and Wisconsin rules are all deemed to 
be different versions of market-share liability, simply because DES 
cases have traditionally been associated with that doctrine.  Rather 
than rely upon the label of market-share liability as used by the courts 
in DES cases, the doctrine must be defined in substantive terms.  The 
doctrine was first articulated by the California Supreme Court, and its 
liability rule is based upon alternative liability.  For this reason, the 
doctrinal basis of market-share liability is appropriately defined in 
those terms, even though some jurisdictions have adopted so-called 
rules of market-share liability in DES cases that do not share the Cali-
fornia court’s doctrinal rationale. 
Rather than rely upon the Summers doctrine, one could try to jus-
tify market-share liability in other ways.102  A justification derived from 
102 The most common justification defines the tort right as entitling the plaintiff to 
compensation for the tortious infliction of risk, conditional upon the occurrence of 
injury, but that justification has not been widely embraced by the courts.  See supra 
notes 4-8 and accompanying text (discussing the viability of risk-based liability).  Mar-
ket-share liability could also be justified if the destruction of a personal injury lawsuit 
were an actionable harm.  In a case similar to Summers, Justice Rand of the Canadian 
Supreme Court justified alternative liability on the ground that the negligent defen-
dants “violated not only the victim’s substantive right to security, but . . . also culpably 
impaired the latter’s remedial right of establishing liability.  By confusing his act with 
environmental conditions, he has, in effect, destroyed the victim’s power of proof.”  
Cook v. Lewis, [1951] S.C.R. 830, 832 (Can.).  The logic of evidential damages can jus-
tify both alternative liability and market-share liability.  See PORAT & STEIN, supra note 
31, at 186-87 (describing the applicability of the evidential damage doctrine to cases 
where the wrongdoer is unidentifiable).  This rationale for market-share liability does 
not persuasively justify the liability rule in California, however, because the California 
Supreme Court has expressly rejected the claim that the destruction of a personal in-
jury lawsuit is an actionable harm.  See Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 
223, 233 n.4 (Cal. 1999) (concluding that “a cause of action for intentional spoliation 
of evidence by a third party does not exist”).  For different arguments that market-
share liability can satisfy the principle of causation, see generally Ripstein & Zipursky, 
supra note 38, at 214-49 (arguing that market-share liability is not an extension of al-
ternative liability, with market-share liability justifiably disabling the defendant from 
simultaneously conceding that it actually caused harm within the general class of plain-
tiffs and effectively denying that it caused harm to any particular plaintiff, while “ensur-
ing that defendants’ liabilities are (at least roughly) limited by the harm they did”); 
Wright, supra note 49, at 1118-19 n.163 (justifying market-share liability as a “second-
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the Summers doctrine, however, has the advantage of depending upon 
the established rule of alternative liability.  The widespread accep-
tance of alternative liability implies that its extension to market-share 
liability should also be widely acceptable. 
III.  FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF EVIDENTIAL GROUPING 
The doctrine of alternative liability has suffered from the lack of 
an identifiable rationale.  “The opinion in Summers did not spell out 
the reasons for this extraordinary liability in any precise way, perhaps 
because the result . . . seems so clearly right on the facts.”103  The two 
defendants acted in the same tortious way at the same time, and al-
though each had a fifty percent chance of actually causing the harm, 
the imposition of liability only incrementally departed from the rule 
that a defendant can be liable for having tortiously created a 50.1% 
chance of causing the injury suffered by the plaintiff.  On these facts, 
the appropriateness of liability is evident, even if the rationale for li-
ability is not.  Without an identifiable rationale, however, the liability 
in Summers seems to be “extraordinary,” making courts understandably 
reluctant to apply the liability rule in any case not factually similar to 
Summers. 
When the American Law Institute first adopted the rule of alter-
native liability in 1965, seventeen years had passed since Summers was 
decided by the California Supreme Court.  Nevertheless, the case law 
continued to adhere closely to the facts of Summers: 
The cases thus far decided in which the rule [of alternative liability] has 
been applied all have been cases in which all of the actors involved have 
been joined as defendants.  All of these cases have involved conduct si-
multaneous in time, or substantially so, and all of them have involved 
conduct of substantially the same character, creating substantially the 
same risk of harm, on the part of each actor.  It is possible that cases may 
arise in which some modification of the rule stated may be necessary be-
cause of complications arising from the fact that one of the actors in-
volved is not or cannot be joined as a defendant, or because of the effect 
of lapse of time, or because of substantial differences in the character of 
the conduct of the actors or the risks which they have created.  Since 
such cases have not arisen, and the situations which might arise are diffi-
cult to forecast, no attempt is made to deal with such problems in this 
best” liability rule that makes the defendant responsible for the harms it caused in the 
aggregate due to the infeasibility of achieving the “first-best” outcome in which liability 
is based on the harm caused in each individual case). 
103 DOBBS, supra note 11, § 175, at 427. 
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[Restatement].  The rule stated [herein] is not intended to preclude pos-
sible modification if such situations call for it.
104
Despite this invitation to extend alternative liability beyond the 
simple facts of Summers, a “number of courts . . . have adopted the 
rule, or stated, that simultaneous tortious conduct by the defendants 
is required,”105 just as in Summers.  In another apparent effort to ad-
here to the facts of Summers, some courts have suggested that alterna-
tive liability is limited to cases involving few potential tortfeasors, rea-
soning that fairness requires a high likelihood that any given 
defendant actually injured the plaintiff.106
A similar problem has occurred with respect to market-share li-
ability.  Like Summers, the DES cases involve compelling circumstances 
for liability, even if the reason for liability is not evident.  And like the 
case law produced by Summers, the absence of a persuasive rationale 
for market-share liability explains why the courts have largely limited 
the liability rule to these easy cases.  “Outside the DES context, mar-
ket-share liability has been sparingly adopted.  Its application has been 
largely rejected primarily on the ground that the product in question 
was not fungible,”107 as it was in the DES cases. 
These limitations of liability are no longer defensible once eviden-
tial grouping is applied to alternative liability, and that doctrine is 
then extended and modified to yield market-share liability.  So, too, 
some otherwise puzzling features of liability rules become under-
standable when considered in relation to evidential grouping. 
A.  Simultaneity 
Even though the defendants’ conduct in Summers occurred at the 
same time, simultaneity is not required by evidential grouping.  As 
long as each defendant’s tortious conduct may have caused the plain-
tiff’s harm, and application of the but-for causal rule to each individ-
ual defendant would absolve all of them from liability in contraven-
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. h (1965). 
105 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 reporters’ 
note cmt. j (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
106 E.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (N.Y. 1989) (stating 
that alternative liability in part depends upon “the notion that where there is a small 
number of possible wrongdoers, all of whom breached a duty to the plaintiff, the like-
lihood that any one of them injured the plaintiff is relatively high, so that forcing them 
to exonerate themselves, or be held liable, is not unfair”). 
107 In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 
593, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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tion of the plaintiff’s proof that someone in the group of defendants 
tortiously caused the harm, then liability can be based upon evidential 
grouping.  The timing of the defendants’ tortious conduct is irrele-
vant.  Evidential grouping therefore explains why the Restatement 
(Third) can defensibly conclude that “simultaneity is both an unneces-
sary and unsupportable requirement:  in each of the cases invoking it, 
there were other adequate grounds for rejecting alternative liability; 
no cogent purpose has been articulated for its retention.”108  As long 
as the named defendant’s conduct has created tortious risk that satis-
fies the requirements of evidential grouping, a plaintiff asserting al-
ternative liability should not need to show simultaneity. 
B.  Number of Defendants 
Some courts have suggested that alternative liability must be lim-
ited to a few defendants, as it was in Summers, even though there is no 
apparent reason “why it is ‘fair’ to impose joint liability without a pre-
ponderance of proof of causation in some cases (small number of de-
fendants) but not in others (large number of defendants) when the 
character of defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s difficulty of proof is 
the same in either instance.”109  Alternative liability does not require a 
small number of defendants when based upon evidential grouping.  
In a case involving a large number of defendants, many individual de-
fendants will have created only a small risk of injuring the plaintiff.  
Evidential grouping treats these defendants fairly.  The liability of 
each defendant is limited by its contribution to the total amount of 
tortious risk created by the group of defendants.110  If there is a small 
likelihood that an individual defendant actually injured the plaintiff, 
then the liability of that defendant is diminished accordingly, elimi-
nating the problem of unfairly excessive liability.  Once again, eviden-
tial grouping explains why the Restatement (Third) can defensibly de-
part from the facts of Summers, this time by recognizing that 
alternative liability “is applicable when there are two or more actors 
whose tortious conduct expose another to risk.”111
108 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 reporters’ 
note cmt. j (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
109 Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc., 751 P.2d 215, 222 (Or. 1988) (en banc). 
110 See infra notes 120-122 and accompanying text (explaining why liability is not 
pro rata but instead based upon the defendant’s contribution to the total tortious risk 
of injury created by the group). 
111 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. j (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
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C.  Proximity 
To recover against a particular defendant under alternative liabil-
ity, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s tortious conduct may 
have caused the injury.  In developing this requirement, courts have 
hewn to the facts of Summers: 
Similarly [to Summers], in many alternative-liability cases, a close connec-
tion exists between the risk of harm created by the defendant’s tortious 
conduct and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.  As that connection be-
comes more tenuous, even while each defendant remains a possible cause 
of the plaintiff’s harm, courts generally refuse to invoke [alternative li-
ability].  Thus, for example, when a defective product injures a person 
who cannot identify which of several manufacturers made the specific 
product, courts refuse to invoke alternative liability against all manufac-
turers of the product.
112
If the proximity requirement is not satisfied, the plaintiff’s proof 
is nothing other than a “naked statistic” or mere probability that, un-
der some circumstances, the defendant could have caused the harm, 
precisely the type of evidence regularly rejected by courts.113  Any 
manufacturer might sell a defective product, but that possibility says 
nothing about what happened on this particular occasion.  The plain-
tiff must provide more specific proof connecting the defendant’s tor-
tious risk to the particular injury—the Restatement (Third) requirement 
of “sufficiently close connection”114—in order to establish alternative 
liability with evidential grouping. 
In asbestos cases, for example, the plaintiff must identify the 
manufacturers of the asbestos products to which she has been ex-
posed.115  Unlike “naked statistics,” such proof shows that in the par-
ticular case, the named manufacturer actually imposed a tortious risk 
upon the plaintiff that may have caused the injury.  By forcing the 
plaintiff to prove direct exposure to each defendant’s tortious risk, a 
court effectively requires the plaintiff to identify the smallest group of 
tortfeasors that actually caused the harm.  The proximity requirement 
112 Id. § 28 cmt. i. 
113 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (explaining how defendants may 
not rely on quantitative probabilities to rebut plaintiff’s particularistic proof). 
114 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. j (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
115 E.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1218 (Cal. 1997) (holding 
that, for a jury instruction shifting the burden of proof to defendants pursuant to the 
rationale of alternative liability, “plaintiffs bore the burden of proof on the issue of ex-
posure to the defendant’s product”). 
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produces a defendant group that mirrors that of Summers in the rele-
vant way. 
The smallest group of tortfeasors that the plaintiff must identify 
depends upon the nature of the defendants’ conduct towards the 
plaintiff.  In DES cases, for example, the plaintiff does not have to 
identify the manufacturer of the specific product to which she has 
been directly exposed.  According to the California Supreme Court, 
the DES cases do not require proof of direct exposure because “hun-
dreds of producers had made the same drug from an identical for-
mula, practically precluding patients from identifying the makers of 
the drugs they took.”116  Given the resulting factual uncertainty, a DES 
plaintiff cannot reasonably identify a group of tortfeasors any smaller 
than the DES manufacturers that were in the relevant market at the 
time of the plaintiff’s exposure.  The nature of the factual uncertainty 
created by the defendant’s conduct makes it unreasonably difficult for 
the DES plaintiff to prove direct exposure to a particular manufac-
turer’s product, explaining why the sale of DES in the relevant market 
constitutes a “sufficiently close connection” between plaintiff’s injury 
and defendant’s conduct. 
The asbestos cases require the plaintiff to prove direct exposure to 
each defendant’s product, even though these cases also involve severe 
practical problems of proof: 
 Apart from the uncertainty of the causation, at a much more con-
crete level uncertainty frequently exists whether the plaintiff was even 
exposed to dangerous fibers from a product produced, distributed or in-
stalled by a particular defendant.  The long latency periods of asbestos-
related cancers mean that memories are often dim and records missing 
or incomplete regarding the use and distribution of specific products.  
In some industries, many different asbestos-containing products have 
been used, often including several similar products at the same time pe-
riods and worksites.  Not uncommonly, plaintiffs have been unable to 
prove direct exposure to a given defendant’s product.
117
116 Id. at 1218-19.  The actual record is more complex.  DES was produced from 
“substantially the same chemical formula,” but manufacturers often sold the drug “in a 
wide variety of forms,” including “pills and capsules [that] came in an assortment of 
sizes, dosages, shapes, coatings, and colors,” and even under “unique brand names.”  
Allen Rostron, Beyond Market-Share Liability:  A Theory of Proportional Share Liability for 
Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151, 160 (2004) (citations omitted).  As the quo-
tation in text indicates, however, in adopting market-share liability the courts have 
treated DES as if it were largely generic.  See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 
37, 44 (Wis. 1984) (“DES was, for the most part, produced in a ‘generic’ form which 
did not contain any clearly identifiable shape, color, or markings.”). 
117 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1218. 
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Unlike DES cases, the problem of factual uncertainty in the asbes-
tos cases is not a result of the defendants’ conduct.  At the time of risk 
exposure, each asbestos manufacturer was not acting in a practically 
indistinguishable manner. Each sold markedly different branded 
products, involving substantially different risk levels.118  Decades later, 
an asbestos plaintiff may face severe practical difficulties in identifying 
the particular manufacturers of the products to which she has been 
directly exposed, but this obstacle is not a result of the defendants’ 
conduct towards the plaintiff but rather of stale evidence produced by 
the passage of time.  Ordinarily, stale evidence is a reason for excul-
pating a defendant from liability, as illustrated by statutes of limita-
tions.119  Taken alone, stale evidence does not justify grouping defen-
dants for evidentiary purposes. 
The courts, therefore, have defensibly required proof of direct 
exposure in the asbestos cases, even though they have not required 
such proof in the DES cases.  In both instances, the required forms of 
proof can be justified by evidential grouping. 
D.  Apportionment of Liability and the Joinder Requirement 
Some courts have rejected alternative liability in product cases be-
cause of concern that joint and several liability would not fairly limit 
the liability of each defendant manufacturer to the amount of harm it 
caused.120  This problem is eliminated by evidential grouping.  When a 
manufacturer is subject to liability by virtue of its membership in the 
causal group, the liability of that manufacturer is appropriately limited 
by its responsibility as a group member.  This responsibility is meas-
ured by the likelihood that the manufacturer actually caused the 
plaintiff’s harm.121  Pursuant to this approach, each manufacturer 
does not have to incur equal or pro rata shares of liability.  For exam-
ple, any defendant that incurs more than its proportionate share of 
liability (based upon the amount of the tortious risk for which it is re-
118 See id. at 1216 (describing reasons why asbestos products have such different 
toxicities); Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1456-58 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying 
Nebraska law; describing the variety of products sold by defendant manufacturers and 
illustrating how memory can aid plaintiffs in identifying the manufacturers of the 
products to which the decedent was exposed). 
119 See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 216, at 552 (including the deterioration of evidence 
as a justification for adjusting statutes of limitations). 
120 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 reporters’ 
note cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (collecting cases). 
121 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
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sponsible) could get contribution from the defendant(s) that paid too 
little.  That outcome could also be achieved more directly if the court 
allowed such an allocation of liability pursuant to the form of joint 
and several liability applicable to cases of alternative liability.  For ex-
ample, each defendant in Summers incurred the same amount of liabil-
ity only because each one was equally likely to have injured the plain-
tiff.  The facts of Summers, not the doctrine of alternative liability, 
required pro rata liability.  The liability is joint because alternative li-
ability requires the joinder of all defendants; the liability is also several 
in order to allow for differing allocations of liability that might not 
otherwise be available under pure joint liability requiring pro rata ap-
portionment.122  Applied in this manner, joint and several liability 
fairly limits the liability of each defendant. 
As long as the plaintiff satisfies the burden of proving that the 
group of defendants, more likely than not, tortiously caused the harm, 
the plaintiff does not have to join all potential tortfeasors.  Any re-
quirement that the plaintiff must join all potential tortfeasors is tan-
tamount to a requirement that the plaintiff prove the prima facie case 
with certainty.  When all potential tortfeasors are joined, there is 
complete certainty that the group of defendants actually caused the 
harm.  A prima facie case of liability, however, does not require the 
plaintiff to satisfy an element with certainty.  Proof that the group of 
defendants, more likely than not, caused the harm establishes a prima 
facie case of liability and identifies the plaintiff as deserving of com-
pensation.123  Once the plaintiff has established her prima facie case, 
evidential grouping justifies shifting the burden to the defendants, 
122 Ordinarily, a defendant that incurs joint and several liability can share liability 
with other defendants (joint liability) or incur the full amount of liability alone (sev-
eral liability).  On its facts, Summers only involved joint liability because each defendant 
was before the court.  See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948) (upholding a find-
ing “that defendants were jointly liable”).  Due to the joinder requirement, any case of 
alternative liability must also involve joint liability.  Nevertheless, courts have inter-
preted alternative liability as involving joint and several liability.  E.g., Rutherford, 941 
P.2d at 1215 (stating that the Summers “court concluded [that] both hunters could be 
found jointly and severally liable for plaintiff’s injuries”).  In order for several liability 
to have any meaning in a case of alternative liability, it must provide the basis for im-
posing upon each defendant its proportionate share of liability when that amount dif-
fers from its pro rata share of liability—the same basis for apportionment provided by 
several liability in market-share cases.  Cf. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 485-
87 (Cal. 1988) (adopting several liability limited to the market share held by each de-
fendant manufacturer in cases of market-share liability). 
123 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (explaining the rationale for the 
preponderance of the evidence standard). 
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who must then disprove causation.  Evidential grouping therefore also 
explains why the Restatement (Third) can defensibly conclude that it 
“would be reasonable to excuse the plaintiff from th[e] joinder re-
quirement when an immunity or lack of jurisdiction prevents the 
joinder.”124
For a case in which every potential tortfeasor has not been joined, 
the plaintiff should not be able to get full recovery from the defen-
dants.  Full recovery would involve liability for each defendant in ex-
cess of its contribution to the total tortious risk of harm created by the 
group of defendants.  When a group of defendants is responsible for 
having created a seventy-five percent chance of causing the harm, the 
sum total of each defendant’s individual liability should equal seventy-
five percent of the total harm.  Each defendant should not be subject 
to joint and several liability, but only to several liability in proportion 
to the amount of tortious risk for which it is responsible.  The liability 
rule is now one of market-share liability and not alternative liability. 
E.  Proof of Risk Contribution 
In a case of market-share liability, the liability of each defendant 
need not depend upon its share of the product market, nor must the 
case involve a fungible product, as neither of these factors was present 
in Summers.  The plaintiff must prove that each defendant created a 
tortious risk that is fungible only in the sense that the risk may have 
actually caused the plaintiff’s injury, and would subject the defendant 
to liability if it did cause the harm.  This requirement, however, is fully 
addressed by the proximity requirement and has nothing to do with 
fungibility per se.  There is no need for an additional requirement 
that the tortious conduct of each defendant must be fungible or sub-
stantially similar.125
For example, a plaintiff who contracted AIDS from either a tort-
feasor who failed to disclose the condition prior to sexual relations or 
from defective (contaminated) blood purchased from multiple blood 
124 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. g (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
125 For extensive argument that fungibility is not required and a good discussion 
of other forms of proof, see generally Rostron, supra note 116.  Unlike the liability rule 
under present consideration, Rostron apparently interprets both alternative and mar-
ket-share liability as forms of proportional or risk-based liability, conditional upon the 
occurrence of injury, which is the same interpretation of these rules that has been of-
fered by others and rejected by a strong plurality of courts.  See supra notes 4-8 and ac-
companying text. 
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suppliers over a period of time, should be able to establish alternative 
liability against both the sexual partner and the blood suppliers if no 
individual defendant is a but-for cause of the disease.  Each defendant 
exposed the plaintiff to a tortious risk that may have caused the injury, 
and one of them actually caused the harm and would be subject to li-
ability for having done so.126  The fact that some defendants otherwise 
engaged in entirely different forms of behavior is irrelevant.  Once the 
other requirements for evidential grouping have been satisfied, each 
defendant’s liability depends only upon the amount of tortious risk 
for which it is responsible.  Liability does not always require market 
shares, and so a more descriptively apt name for the liability rule 
might be “risk-adjusted” liability. 
In applying this rule, the Restatement (Third) expresses concern 
about the litigation costs of determining the amount of risk attribut-
able to each defendant and “the existence and accuracy” of such 
data.127  These concerns are alleviated by evidential grouping. 
The plaintiff must establish liability by a preponderance of the 
evidence with respect to the issues of duty and breach.  The plaintiff 
must also prove that the group of defendants, more likely than not, 
tortiously caused the injury.  This proof is sufficient to establish the 
prima facie case of liability against each of the defendant tortfeasors.  
These requirements prevent the plaintiff from recovering when the 
causal evidence does not exist or is not sufficiently reliable.  Perhaps 
defendants should incur a legal responsibility for the factual uncer-
tainty in some of these cases, but any rationale for doing so is not 
based upon evidential grouping.128
Once the plaintiff provides the requisite proof on causation, how-
ever, she has established a prima facie case of liability against each of 
the defendant tortfeasors.  Under evidential grouping, the remaining 
126 If the defendant blood suppliers in this example were immune from liability 
due to a blood-shield statute, the plaintiff would lose.  Rather than relying exclusively 
upon the other defendants’ tortious conduct—the only form of exculpatory proof 
barred by evidential grouping—the blood suppliers instead invoke the blood-shield 
statute.  Once these defendants are removed from the case, the plaintiff can proceed 
only against the sexual partner, who on these facts did not create more than a fifty 
percent chance of injuring the plaintiff. 
127 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. o (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
128 Cf. GEISTFELD, supra note 83, at 186-93 (explaining why strict products liability 
can entail manufacturer liability for the failure to warn of a factual uncertainty based 
upon reasonable scientific evidence, such as the possibility that the product might be 
carcinogenic). 
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issue involves the extent of liability for each defendant, an issue of 
damages that does not generate the evidentiary concerns expressed by 
the Restatement (Third). 
Consider the evidence a court would rely upon to determine 
damages in a case involving a promising third-year law student who 
was permanently disabled by the defendant’s tortious misconduct, 
leaving her unable to practice law.  As part of the damages award, the 
plaintiff could collect the future earnings she would lose as a result of 
the tortious injury.  Various types of evidence show how much a law 
student is likely to earn in the future.  But even the best evidence of 
projected future earnings cannot establish that this particular student, 
more likely than not, would in fact receive these earnings thirty or 
forty years from now had she not been permanently disabled.  Such 
certainty is not possible for damage calculations extending far into the 
future.  The more-likely-than-not evidentiary standard would bar many 
claims for lost future earnings. 
Barring the plaintiff from recovery would be unjust, though, be-
cause the evidentiary problem was created by the defendant’s tortious 
wrongdoing.  Had the defendant’s tortious conduct not permanently 
disabled the student, there would be no need to estimate the student’s 
lost future earnings.  Hence it would be “a perversion of fundamental 
principles of justice” if the uncertainty created by the defendant’s tor-
tious misconduct were to bar the plaintiff from recovering damages.129  
To avoid this injustice, tort law reduces the plaintiff’s burden of proof 
regarding causal questions in the damages phase.  The plaintiff is only 
required to establish the amount of damages with “as much certainty 
as the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit.”130
Under evidential grouping, the plaintiff must prove that each de-
fendant, more likely than not, may have been a tortious cause of the 
injury and would be subject to liability for having caused or contrib-
uted to the injury, and that the group of defendants, more likely than 
not, did cause the injury.  Having established a right to compensation 
with sufficiently reliable evidence, the plaintiff faces a reduced eviden-
tiary burden regarding the exact amount of risk attributable to each 
defendant.  That issue is only relevant for determining the amount of 
a defendant’s liability—a damages question.  The proof may be diffi-
cult to procure, unavailable or inaccurate, but the same problem rou-
129 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 
(1931). 
130 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (1979). 
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tinely exists in the damages phase of tort cases.  As is true in other tort 
cases, the difficulty of determining the exact amount of damages is 
not a compelling reason for denying the plaintiff recovery altogether.  
The plaintiff must instead prove the amount of damages, or the 
amount of tortious risk created by each defendant, with “as much cer-
tainty” as can be reasonably expected in the circumstances of the 
case.131
This approach solves an otherwise puzzling problem of factual 
uncertainty posed by many asbestos cases.  The nature of the problem 
has been fully depicted by the California Supreme Court: 
 At the most fundamental level, there is scientific uncertainty regard-
ing the biological mechanisms by which inhalation of certain micro-
scopic fibers of asbestos leads to lung cancer and mesothelioma.  Al-
though in some cases medical experts have testified that asbestos-related 
cancer is the final result of the fibrosis (scarring) process, a general ref-
erence on the subject describes the link between fibrosis and carcino-
genesis as “a debated issue for which further extensive analysis is 
needed.”  An answer to this biological question would be legally relevant, 
because if each episode of scarring contributes cumulatively to the for-
mation of a tumor or the conditions allowing such formation, each sig-
nificant exposure by the plaintiff to asbestos fibers would be deemed a 
cause of the plaintiff’s cancer; if, on the other hand, only one fiber or 
group of fibers actually causes the formation of a tumor, the others 
would not be legal causes of the plaintiff’s injuries.
132
As the court observes, resolution of the factual uncertainty affects 
the form of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.  Suppose the injury was 
caused by only one significant exposure to asbestos fibers.  In this sce-
nario, the plaintiff could rely on alternative liability by suing all poten-
tial tortfeasors, a requirement that the plaintiff in the above case was 
unable to satisfy.133  Resolution of the factual uncertainty, however, 
could show that the injury was caused by cumulative exposures.  Each 
131 The English courts have adopted this approach for cases in which the plaintiff 
cannot identify the actual cause of harm.  See Allen v. British Rail Eng’g Ltd., [2001] 
ICR PIQR 942, 952 (A.C.) (“The court must do the best it can on the evidence to make 
the apportionment and should not be astute to deny the claimant relief on the basis 
that he cannot establish with demonstrable accuracy precisely what proportion of his 
injury is attributable to the defendant’s tortious conduct.”); Holtby v. Brigham & 
Cowan (Hull) Ltd., (2000) 3 All E.R. 421, 429 (A.C.) (“I do not think that these cases 
should be determined on onus of proof. . . . [T]he court only has to do the best it can 
using its common sense . . . .”). 
132 Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., 941 P.2d 1203, 1218 (Cal. 1997) (citations omitted). 
133 See id. at 1208 n.3 (identifying three additional manufacturers that were not 
named as defendants). 
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defendant would then have significantly contributed to the harm, 
making each defendant a cause of the entire injury and subjecting 
each to joint and several liability for the entire injury.134  As the court 
framed the issue, whether the plaintiff could recover at all depended 
upon resolution of the factual uncertainty, an impossibility given the 
current state of knowledge. 
The court rejected alternative liability and imposed joint and sev-
eral liability upon the group of defendant asbestos suppliers, thereby 
resolving the problem of factual uncertainty in the plaintiff’s favor: 
Plaintiffs cannot be expected to prove the scientifically unknown details 
of carcinogenesis, or trace the unknowable path of a given asbestos fiber.  
But the impossibility of such proof does not dictate use of a burden shift 
[under alternative liability].  Instead, we can bridge this gap in the hu-
manly knowable by holding that plaintiffs may prove causation in asbes-
tos-related cancer cases by demonstrating that the plaintiff’s exposure to 
defendant’s asbestos-containing product in reasonable medical probabil-
ity was a substantial factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of asbes-
tos the plaintiff or decedent inhaled or ingested, and hence to the risk of 
developing asbestos-related cancer, without the need to demonstrate 
that fibers from the defendant’s particular product were the ones, or 
among the ones, that actually produced the malignant growth.
135
The import of this holding is unclear.  Does it mean that anytime 
there are two equally plausible scientific interpretations of the evi-
dence, one allowing recovery and the other denying it, the plaintiff 
can recover?  How would such a rule relate to the ordinary evidentiary 
standard requiring the plaintiff to prove each element of the prima 
facie case by a preponderance of the evidence?  These problems do 
not exist if the holding allows the plaintiff to recover merely for the 
tortious infliction of risk, conditional upon injury.  Is the liability rule 
best interpreted in those terms?  These questions are highly signifi-
cant, as the rule of joint and several liability for asbestos exposure has 
been widely adopted by the courts.136
134 See, e.g., Ravo v. Rogatnick, 514 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (N.Y. 1987) (explaining that 
the defendants in such cases “are considered ‘joint tort-feasors’ and in legal contem-
plation, there is a joint enterprise and a mutual agency, such that the act of one is the 
act of all and liability for all that is done is visited upon each”(citations omitted)). 
135 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1219 (citations omitted). 
136 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 reporters’ 
note cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (collecting cases showing that “[s]ince 
the first asbestos case in which a plaintiff was successful, courts have allowed plaintiffs 
to recover from all defendants to whose asbestos products the plaintiff was exposed”). 
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When based upon evidential grouping, this liability rule can be 
squared with existing doctrine.  This approach enables the plaintiff to 
base the prima facie case upon the risk-adjusted variant of market-
share liability.  Risk-adjusted liability would not give the plaintiff full 
recovery; damages would instead be discounted by the probability that 
the group of defendant asbestos suppliers tortiously caused the harm.  
Due to this potential basis for liability, the plaintiff is now entitled to 
some recovery, no matter how the factual uncertainty is resolved.  If 
asbestos-related cancer does in fact require only a single exposure, the 
plaintiff would get partial recovery (under risk-adjusted liability).  If 
the asbestos-related cancer instead involves cumulative exposure, the 
plaintiff would get full recovery (under the rule of joint and several 
liability for concurrent or successive tortfeasors).  The factual uncer-
tainty, therefore, only affects the extent of liability or amount of dam-
ages that should be incurred by each defendant.  In the damages 
phase of trial, tort law places the problem of factual uncertainty upon 
the defendants, enabling the plaintiff to prove the extent of liability 
with evidence that is reasonable given the factual uncertainty inher-
ently involved in the damages calculation.  The asbestos plaintiff’s 
causal proof satisfies this requirement; there is a reasonable scientific 
basis for concluding that cumulative asbestos exposure causes injury, 
despite the equally plausible basis for concluding otherwise (under 
the single-exposure theory).  By awarding plaintiffs full damages pur-
suant to the rule of joint and several liability, the courts are resolving a 
damages issue on the basis of a well-established tort principle. 
The problem of factual uncertainty often involves the lack of good 
evidence regarding the amount of tortious risk attributable to each 
defendant.  As illustrated by the asbestos cases, once the plaintiff has 
proven the prima facie case with sufficiently reliable evidence, the dif-
ficulty of quantifying the causal contribution of each defendant does 
not provide a persuasive reason for denying the plaintiff recovery al-
together. 
F.  The Plaintiff’s Causal Responsibility 
According to the Restatement (Third), in cases of alternative liability 
“[t]he rationale for shifting the burden of proof to defendants whose 
tortious conduct exposed the plaintiff to a risk of harm is that, as be-
tween two culpable defendants and an innocent plaintiff, it is prefer-
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able to put the risk of error on the culpable defendants.”137  What if 
the plaintiff is not “innocent” like the plaintiff in Summers, but was in-
stead contributorily negligent in causing the harm?  The Restatement 
(Third) leaves open the question of whether the rationale for alterna-
tive liability still applies,138 and a leading treatise casts doubt on the 
availability of alternative liability in such cases.139
To rely upon evidential grouping, the plaintiff must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that she is a deserving plaintiff who 
was tortiously injured by the group of defendants, and that each de-
fendant may have tortiously caused the harm and would be subject to 
liability for having done so.  At the time when Summers was decided, a 
deserving plaintiff was necessarily innocent, because a contributorily 
negligent plaintiff was barred from recovery altogether.140  With the 
widespread adoption of comparative fault, a contributorily negligent 
plaintiff is no longer barred from recovery.141  A plaintiff does not 
have to be “innocent” in order to deserve or be entitled to tort com-
pensation from the defendant wrongdoers.  The rationale for eviden-
tial grouping is based upon the way in which the proof identifies the 
plaintiff as deserving of compensation, and so comparative fault en-
ables a contributorily negligent plaintiff to rely upon alternative liabil-
ity and market-share or risk-adjusted liability.142
Comparative fault applies to cases in which the evidence shows 
that both the plaintiff and at least one of the defendants were each a 
tortious cause of the entire injury, but the factual uncertainty makes it 
impossible for the plaintiff to identify the actual tortfeasor within a 
group of defendants.  The injury, in other words, would have been 
avoided if the plaintiff had exercised reasonable care, or it would have 
been avoided if every defendant had exercised reasonable care.  
137 Id. § 28 cmt. f. 
138 Id. cmt. n (taking no position as to whether alternative liability still applies in 
cases of comparative negligence, due to the lack of case law and the fact that alterna-
tive liability developed when plaintiff’s own negligence would have barred recovery 
anyway). 
139 DOBBS, supra note 11, § 175, at 429 (“If the plaintiff herself is at fault and may 
have been a cause of her own harm, the strong moral basis for treating the negligent 
defendants as causes in fact . . . could become quite attenuated.”). 
140 Id. § 199, at 494. 
141 Comparative fault began to be widely adopted in the 1970s.  See, e.g., Li v. Yel-
low Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (Cal. 1975) (noting that, by 1975, twenty-
three states had already adopted some variant of comparative negligence).  “By the 
1980s, only four states . . . had failed to adopt comparative negligence rules.”  DOBBS, 
supra note 11, § 201, at 504. 
142 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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These cases involve harms tortiously caused by both the plaintiff and 
defendant(s), the type of harm apportioned by standard application 
of comparative fault principles.143
The plaintiff’s recovery can also be reduced even if her causal 
contribution to the injury did not involve contributory negligence.  In 
some cases, either the plaintiff or at least one of the defendants was 
the exclusive cause of harm, but the factual uncertainty makes it im-
possible to determine who actually caused the injury.  The asbestos 
cases, for example, have involved workers with lung cancer who could 
have gotten the disease either from smoking cigarettes or asbestos ex-
posure.144  In such cases, the plaintiff may be unable to prove that the 
group of defendants, more likely than not, tortiously caused the harm.  
Without such proof, the plaintiff cannot prevail under evidential 
grouping.  But if the plaintiff can prove that the group of defendants, 
more likely than not, tortiously caused the harm, then the plaintiff’s 
recovery should be reduced by her risk contribution, regardless of 
whether it involved contributory negligence.  The plaintiff’s conduct 
created some risk of actually (and exclusively) causing the harm, 
thereby reducing the risk (and amount of liability) attributable to 
each defendant.  For injuries that could have been caused solely by 
the plaintiff’s conduct, liability can still be fairly apportioned among 
the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
In a case not involving market-share liability or its doctrinal 
predecessor, alternative liability, Judge Guido Calabresi made an ob-
servation about tort litigation that succinctly summarizes the jurispru-
dence of these two important forms of tort liability: 
 In cases that are dramatic and involve “hot” issues, there is a tendency 
for the parties to describe themselves as raising new issues that are re-
markable in their legal context.  But in fact, such cases are usually best 
looked at in the most traditional of ways.  Courts must see how these 
cases fit into old categories before considering whether it is either neces-
143 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 (2000) 
(discussing factors for assigning shares of responsibility when two or more actors, in-
cluding the plaintiff, are legal causes of the same injury). 
144 E.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1207-08 (Cal. 1997) (involv-
ing a worker with lung cancer who smoked a pack of cigarettes every day for over thirty 
years and also had been heavily exposed to asbestos-containing products throughout 
the entire period). 
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sary or proper to expand those old categories or to create new ones.  
And so it is with the case before us.
145
Alternative liability and market-share liability involve “hot” cases 
raising the remarkable issue of whether tort compensation is for the 
exposure to tortious risk or the tortious infliction of injury.  Rather 
than identify traditional rationales for these liability rules, many torts 
scholars have relied upon the nontraditional justification that the tort 
right involves protection from risk rather than injury.146  This nontra-
ditional justification has not fared well in the courts.  The courts do 
not believe that these forms of liability make it “either necessary or 
proper to expand . . . old categories or to create new ones,” as 
Calabresi put it.  The courts, however, have not adequately identified 
the traditional justification for the doctrines.  The absence of such a 
rationale has not curtailed the adoption of alternative liability, proba-
bly because the leading case of Summers v. Tice seemed “so clearly right 
on the facts.”147  The absence of a traditional justification has instead 
severely limited market-share liability.  Unable to see how market-
share liability fits into old categories, a strong plurality of courts have 
rejected that doctrine for rendering “too great a chasm in the tort-law 
requirement of factual causation.”148  Based upon a survey of this case 
law, the Restatement (Third) concludes that there is no “emerging con-
sensus or trend” concerning market-share liability.149  The doctrine 
has stalled in the courts. 
The future of market-share liability may critically depend upon 
whether it can be “fit into old categories.”  The courts apparently be-
lieve that alternative liability has such a justification, and so it provides 
the most promising doctrinal basis for market-share liability.  In order 
for either of these liability rules to satisfy the fundamental tort re-
quirement of causation, the plaintiff’s causal proof must apply to the 
group of defendant tortfeasors.  Grouping the defendants in this 
manner can be justified by the established tort principle that exculpa-
tory causal proof does not consist of the claim that “Yes, I may have 
caused the injury, but the remaining group of defendants, more likely 
145 McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 161 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., dissent-
ing) (citation omitted). 
146 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (discussing the deterrence and fair-
ness justifications for using a risk-based conception of tort liability). 
147 DOBBS, supra note 11, § 175, at 427. 
148 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. o (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
149 Id. 
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than not, caused the harm.”  As applied to each defendant, this form 
of proof would deny a plaintiff’s recovery, even though the defendant 
cannot reasonably deny that the plaintiff has proven that someone in 
the group of defendants, and possibly the defendant herself, caused 
the injury in a manner that entitles the plaintiff to compensation.  To 
avoid this injustice, tort law bars the defendants from relying upon 
such exculpatory evidence. 
A defendant cannot avoid liability merely by blaming the rest of 
the causal group when the evidence shows that she belongs to the 
group.  The decision is normative, but it has already been made by 
tort law.  It is an “old category” that provides the doctrinal unity be-
tween alternative liability and market-share liability.  These liability 
rules often apply to “hot” cases, but as Calabresi observed, that does 
not mean they must be justified in a new, remarkable manner. 
 
